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SUMMARY 
As the guardian of power system network, protective relays are ubiquitous, assuring 
power system operation by reliably and selectively isolating faulty power system 
xix 
 
components in minimum possible time. During the past three decades, the introduction of 
microprocessor-based relays and the advancement of communication technology has 
enriched both the functionality and computational capability of numerical protective relays 
in many folds. Yet, despite the fact that research effort in this field leads to more 
sophisticated protection functions that overcome many dependability and security issues 
brought by the protection functions that were once simple, such sophistication also 
introduces unpredictable human errors in setting for a single relay and coordinating an 
entire protection system. Meanwhile, protection gaps still exist in many ways. The two 
causes contribute to protective relay mis-operations that may result into system wide 
disturbances or even blackouts. The November 1965 blackout was initiated by a line relay 
mis-operation. Moreover, most sub-causes from the relay mis-operations can be associated 
with transmission line protection.  
This thesis proposes a dynamic state estimation based protection algorithm for the 
transmission line to 1) eliminate complex protection settings in order to prevent human 
error, 2) fulfill the protection gaps caused by legacy protection functions, and as a result, 
reduce relay mis-operations. The dynamic model of the line is first converted into an 
equivalent algebraic companion form by quadratic integration (if the current transformer 
is also modeled then quadratization process is also needed). Then three dynamic state 
estimation algorithms and the protection logic based on the estimation results are 
introduced for the protection purpose. The proposed algorithm is compared with legacy 
protection functions in numerous test cases. 
Chapter 1 introduces the scope, background and motivation of the problem; Chapter 2 
summarizes the traditional protection algorithms, requirements, advantages and 
xx 
 
disadvantages, as well as state of the art fault detection algorithms; Chapter 3 presents the 
overall approach and conceptual design of the proposed algorithm in this thesis in order to 
address the issues brought by traditional algorithms; Chapter 4 derives the mathematical 
model needed for the proposed approach; Chapter 5 describes the underlying dynamic state 
estimation algorithm for the mathematical model and corresponding protection logic; 
Chapter 6 describes the laboratory setup for demonstration; Chapter 7 presents numeral 
test cases against traditional methods, all cases can be demonstrated via the laboratory 







CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Problem Statement 
As the guardian of power system transmission network, transmission line protective 
relays are ubiquitous, assuring power system operation by reliably and selectively isolating 
faulty power system components or regions in minimum possible time. During the past 
three decades, the introduction of microprocessor-based relays and the advancement of 
communication technology has enriched both the functionality and computational 
capability of numerical transmission line protective relays in many folds. Yet, despite the 
fact that research effort in this field leads to more sophisticated protection functions that 
overcome many dependability and security issues brought by the line protection functions 
that were once simple, 1) such sophistication also complicates the commissioning process 
and introduces unpredictable human errors in setting a single relay and coordinating an 
entire transmission network protection system. Improper settings and coordination of 
protective relays comes from the fact that traditional line protection schemes are based on 
limited information, i.e., they monitor limited number of quantities (for example just three 
voltages and three currents of the transmission line) and act when the quantities enter a pre-
specified locus (settings). While present day line protection engineers have many analytical 
tools, settings and coordination rely heavily on engineer’s experiences. The coordinated 
settings exhibit limitations for two reasons: (a) limited relay information and (b) there are 
typically competing factors. An example is the stepped distance protection for a long 
transmission line with series compensated capacitor. The distance element has no 
information on the status of the capacitor, so once the capacitor is put into service, the 
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distance protection would overreach the line if settings are not correctly adjusted according 
to the status of the capacitor. 2) Meanwhile, protection gaps still exist in line protection in 
many ways. The two causes contribute to transmission line protective relay mis-operations 
that may result into 1) system wide disturbances or 2) even blackouts. 
In 2012, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) outlined a 
preliminary set of high priority reliability issues, ranking relay mis-operations as top 
priority concern [1]. As a result, Protection System Mis-operations Task Force (PSMTF) 
was formed to investigate system disturbances caused by relay mis-operations. Of 1500 
mis-operation records analyzed, 28% were categorized as incorrect setting/logic/design 
errors [2]. Specific causes associated with transmission line protection include improper 
zone timers and time overcurrent coordination, overreaching zone 1, instantaneous 
overcurrent elements, improper coordination of directional comparison blocking trip and 
block elements, improper modeling, and others. 20% of the 1500 mis-operations were due 
to relay failures (calibration issue, internal failure, firmware issue, and so on), 17% were 
due to communication failures, 12% unexplainable, 9% personnel error (wrong wiring), 8% 
AC system error (failures that include instrument transformer failure and VT or CT 
secondary circuit failures), 5% DC system error (failures to a station’s dc system such as 
station battery), 1% others.  
The November 9, 1965 Blackout, which occurred in the Northeastern United States 
and Ontario, originated from a relay mis-operation. The event began when 230 kV 
transmission lines from a hydro generating facility were heavily loaded due to high power 
transfer from the hydro facility to a major load center which was hit by a cold weather 
while coupled with outage of a nearby steam plant. The zone 3 backup relay were set at a 
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power level well below the capacity of the line to detect the fault beyond the next switching 
point from the generating plant. From the time the relays were initially set, the settings 
remained unchanged while the loads on the lines steadily increased. Under the heavy load 
circumstance, the plant operator attempted to increase the power transfer on one of the 230 
kV lines in order to support the major load center, without awareness of the relay limitation. 
As a result, the load impedance entered the zone 3 operating characteristics and the relay 
tripped the circuit breaker. Consequently, the load on the tripped line redistributed to the 
rest of the five lines. As a result, each line breaker was tripped within 2.7 seconds. With all 
lines tripped, the hydro generators were disconnected from the loads and started 
accelerating. This resulting drop in generation at the hydro plant and the rapid build-up of 
generation in the interconnected system resulted in large power swings that resulted in a 
loss of synchronism between two portions of the system. The massive outage lasted a few 
days in some area and directly affected 30 million people [3]. 
The problem associated with transmission line relay mis-operation stems from 1) the 
complexity of protective relay setting. The relay engineers have to manage 100-150 
protective relays in a modern substation, 2) the natural disadvantages of the traditional 
protection functions. The directional elements are vulnerable with close faults, the 
overcurrent element under-reaches the full transmission line (or overreaches), the stepped 
distance element does not work well with series compensation, the current differential has 




1.2 Research Objectives 
The dissertation objectives are: 1) to avoid setting and coordination errors, and 2) to 
fulfill numerous protection gaps. An approach is proposed that does not require 
coordination and simplify the settings, and that demonstrates better dependability, security, 
and sensitivity in simulation environment. Towards this goal, the proposed approach is to 
exploit dynamic state estimation that monitor the operating condition of a protection zone 
and use this information to protect the zone. Specifically, the mathematical model of any 
protection zone is first expressed in object oriented format by quadratizing the differential 
algebraic equations of the zone (if the model has nonlinear order higher than two), and 
performing quadratic integration over the differential equations. Secondly dynamic state 
estimation algorithms for the object oriented model are described, and probability of 
whether the measurements match the model, i.e., confidence level, is developed over the 
estimation results. The protection logic examines the average of the confidence level over 
an integration window and issues a tripping command if the average drops below a certain 
threshold. Compared with legacy protection functions, this proposed approach requires no 
coordination, and the only settings are the integration window size and confidence level 
threshold. 3) to propose an infrastructure of data acquisition module and data processing 
module for the proposed transmission line protective relay that takes advantage of the 
prototype IEC 61850 compliant sensor, and implement laboratory setup for demonstration. 
4) to investigate the performance of the DSE based protection in numerous test cases, 5) to 





1.3 Thesis Outline 
The outline of the remaining parts of this dissertation is as follows. 
In Chapter 2, background information is provided on the origin of the transmission 
line protection topic along with presently available technologies that are being used. In 
addition, a thorough literature survey is presented that summarizes related research work 
efforts. In particular, the survey starts with a summary of the current line protection 
functions. The presently utilized technology for line protection along with its limitations 
are presented. Synchronizing technology (GPS and IRIG-B) and how it can be utilized for 
the development of modern protection functions is also presented. Next the state-of-art 
fault detection, identification technology for general engineering systems is summarized. 
Chapter 3 presents the overall approach and the conceptual design of the infrastructure 
of data acquisition systems, which provides the necessary information for an automated 
transmission line protective relay. 
Chapter 4 presents the general and detailed methodology for the derivation of an 
object-oriented, interoperable, and unified model for components in the power system. The 
model is named as the state and control algebraic quadratic companion form (SCAQCF). 
Transmission lines as an example for how to derive the SCAQCF model from the original 
differential and algebraic equations of the component is also given. Both single and multi-
section models are included. 
Chapter 5 presents in detail the mathematical formulation and the solution 
methodology of the developed dynamic state estimator. The mathematical model and the 
categorization of the DSE measurements are also presented. The DSE solution algorithm 
and performance evaluation follow.  
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Chapter 6 discusses the detailed implementation for the proposed line protective relay 
in laboratory environment, including the infrastructure of data acquisition system that take 
advantage of the merging unit technology, the communication workflow between the 
proposed line protective relay and the IEC 61850 compliant sensors (merging units), the 
new human machine interface for relay settings, and the laboratory setup for numerical 
experiments. 
Chapter 7 presents numerous test cases in evaluating the performance of the proposed 
approach in metrics of dependability, security and sensitivity with current state-of-art 
protection functions, and also investigates several practical issues including CT/PT error. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the research work and outlines the results and 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides the background information of existing technologies related to 
the proposed research along with a literature review of the research efforts on these topics. 
Section 2.2 starts with the evolution and a summary of the technologies for protective 
relays and the current architecture of a modern relay. Section 2.3 then summarizes the 
currently utilized technology in transmission line protection functions in the modern 
architecture. Lastly Section 2.4 provides a literature review on the state-of-the-art fault 
detection, identification (diagnosis) algorithms utilized for general engineering systems 
from a broader context that treats the power system as a specific example. 
2.2 The Evolution of Protective Relays 
Originally electromechanical relays were used to protect power systems. Most relays 
used either electromagnetic attraction or electromagnetic induction principle for their 
operation. Plunger type relays formed instantaneous units for detecting overcurrent or over-
voltage conditions. Balanced-beam relays provided differential protection, distance 
protection as well as low burden overcurrent units. These relays operated when the 
magnitude of an operating signal was larger than the magnitude of the restraining signal. 
These relays were classified as amplitude comparators. Single input induction type relays 
provided operations with time delays – such as induction disk from Westinghouse and 
induction cup from GE. Two input induction type relays provided directional protection. 
The operation of these relays depended on the phase displacement between the applied 
electrical inputs. These relays were classified as phase comparators.  
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The invention of the transistor in the late 1940s and the subsequent advancement of 
solid state technology in the early 1960s made it possible to replace bulky 
electromechanical relays with solid state relays. The major advantage of these relays was 
that no moving parts were needed for performing their intended functions. The operating 
speeds of these relays were also more than the speed of their electro-mechanical 
counterparts and, their reset times were less than the reset times of their electromechanical 
counterparts [4].  
Solid-state relays appeared to be the technology poised to replace the 
electromechanical counterparts in late 1960s when researchers ventured into the use of 
computers for power system protection. The first computer relay was developed in 1970 
with a trial implementation in a substation in California. Later the attempts and the 
advances in the Very Large Scale Integrated technology and software techniques in the 
1970s led to the development of microprocessor-based relays (numerical relays) that were 
first offered as commercial devices in 1979. Early designs use the fundamental approaches 
that were previously used in the electromechanical relays. In spite of the developments of 
complex algorithms for implementing protection functions, the numerical relays in those 
days did not incorporate them. The major advantage is that it allows multiple protection 
functions in a very small package (space) and at a low cost (economy). Specifically, the 
protection of a transmission line required several single function electromechanical relays 
taking several racks in a substation control house. Now the entire set of microprocessor-
based relays is typically housed in a 19 inch by 8 inch device. Meanwhile 
electromechanical relays had no significant drawbacks in their protection functions, but the 
additional features offered by the microprocessor technologies encouraged the evolution 
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of relays that introduced many changes to the industry. These features include 1) 
customized logic schemes, 2) much less burden on instrument transformers than the burden 
placed by the relays of the previous technologies, 3) microprocessor-based relays can be 
programmed to detect saturation of instrument transformers for minimizing incorrect 
operations, 4) fewer instrument transformer connections as some quantities such as zero 
sequence can be internally computed, 5) sequence of events and oscillography, 6) self-
monitoring and self-testing, and 7) numerical relays are equipped with communication 
ports and allow engineers to access the relay from the comfort of their office, review 
settings, enter new settings, etc. At the same time, several trends are emerging. These 
include common hardware platforms, configuring the software to perform different 
functions, integrating protection with substation control, and substituting cables carrying 
voltages and currents with fiber optic lines carrying signals in the form of polarized light. 
The evolution of microprocessor-based protection systems has not been without its 
challenges. The industry has, however, come to the conclusion that the benefits far 
outweigh the shortcomings. This has gradually increased the acceptance of numerical 
relays during the previous twenty years. The current architecture for a modern relay is a 
device containing a central processing unit (CPU) that handles multiple types of input and 
output signals, see Figure 2.1. The voltage and current transformers reduced the level of 
voltage and current signals typically to 67 V and 5 A nominal value respectively. The 
outputs of instrument transformers are applied to the analog input subsystem of the relay. 
This subsystem electrically isolates the relay from the power system. The analog inputs are 




A relaying algorithm, which is a part of the software, processes the acquired 
information. The algorithm uses signal-processing techniques to estimate the magnitudes 
and angles of voltages and current phasors, and also frequency. These measurements are 
used to calculate other quantities, such as impedances. The computed quantities are then 
compared with pre-specified threshold (settings) to decide whether the power system is 
experiencing a fault/abnormal operating condition or not. If it is, the relay sends a 
command to open one or more circuit breakers for isolating the minimum faulted zone of 
the power system. The trip output is transmitted to the circuit breaker through the digital 
output subsystem by energizing the trip coil. 
 





2.3 Survey of Legacy Protection Functions 
A transmission line is mainly protected by the following protection functions in a 
multi-function relay: (1) directional instantaneous overcurrent (2) directional time 
overcurrent, (3) stepped distance, (4) pilot scheme, and (5) current differential. These 
functions are reviewed next. As an example, see the General Electric L90 current 
differential protection system in Figure 2.2 [5], both the instantaneous overcurrent 
(50P/50G) and time overcurrent (51P/51G) are supervised by directional element (67P), 
and distance protection (21P), phase segregated current differential (87L/87LG), and pilot 
scheme via dedicated communication in the assistance of distance element. For full line 
protection, all these functions are applied as in a multi-function numerical relay and it is 
expected that at least one will trip the line for any fault that may occur in the line and will 
not operate for any faults outside the line. While this is true for the majority of faults, it is 
also true that there are fault events on the line that these schemes may miss, see Chapter 7 
where none of the legacy methods detect the high impedance fault, or they may trip the 
line for some faults outside the protected line (mis-operations), see Chapter 7 where 




Figure 2-2 General Electric L90 Current Differential Protection System [5]  
 
 
2.3.1 Directional Instantaneous Overcurrent Protection 
The directional instantaneous overcurrent relay, one of the first and simplest protective 
relays, developed around 60-70 years ago, is still used in transmission line protection [6]. 
The relay monitors the electric current in the secondary of the current transformer and when 
this current exceeds a threshold and the direction of the fault is forward, relay bit is 
activated which eventually may operate a contact that is integrated with the tripping system 
of a breaker.  
 
















For transmission lines where loop system is dominant, a directional element indicating 
whether the fault direction is forward or reverse to the tripping zone is necessary to 
supervise the overcurrent element (and also distance element). There are several ways to 
design the directional element [7]-[8].  1) Directional element responds to the phase shift 
between a polarizing quantity and an operate quantity. For forward faults, the measured 
current lags the measured voltage by the fault loop impedance angle, for reverse faults the 
measured current leads the measured voltage by 180 degrees minus the fault loop 
impedance angle. The options for selecting polarizing and operating signals vary and 
include voltage or current signals (Va, Ia), phase pairs (Vab, Iab), or symmetrical 
components (V1, I1). Before numerical relays, the operating quantity and polarizing 
quantity are applied to induction cup electromechanical relays via two individual windings. 
The relay was designed such that no rotational movement or torque occurred when the 
magnetic fluxes of the two coils were in phase (zero torque angle), and maximum torque 
when they were certain degrees apart (maximum torque angle). Usually negative or zero 
sequence quantities are preferred over quadrature quantities as Warrington first identified 
a security weakness of the quadrature-polarized phase directional element. When the 
source behind the relay is strong, the voltage measured at the relay location for a remote 
fault can be too small to overcome the minimum torque requirement of a torque-product 
directional element, thus 2) rather than the product, another approach to use the ratio of 
negative sequence voltage and current, or negative sequence impedance was used. For a 
fault in front of the relay, the measured negative sequence impedance equals minus source 
impedance behind the relay, for a fault behind the relay, the measured impedance equals 
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the line impedance plus the remote source impedance. Thus by comparing the measured 
value with thresholds, this element also yields the fault direction. 
While this function is very simple, the disadvantages stem from the fact that the pickup 
setting must have sufficient margin (under reach the full length of line) to avoid operation 
for external fault [9]: 1) for a short transmission line the fault current level (for both phase 
and ground element) at local end and remote end can be approximately the same, thus it is 
difficult to set a pickup value to differentiate internal and external fault. 2) the appropriate 
setting for both phase and ground element is affected by variations in system conditions 
(source impedance), and it’s difficult to obtain adaptive settings based on system conditions. 
For transmission lines, if the number of generating units on line changes due to 
maintenance outage, the source impedance varies as well as the fault current level. Several 
other protection challenges exist for ground element, 1) the mutual coupling from a parallel 
line can result in incorrect direction determination as well as increased or reduced 
sensitivity [9], 2) single phase tripping on remote end, adjacent lines or mutually coupled 
lines can result in zero sequence current that cause a false trip [10]-[11], 3) weak source 
(when strong source out of service) may contribute relatively low current magnitude 
undetected by overcurrent element [12]. 
 
2.3.2 Directional Time Overcurrent Protection 
Different from directional instantaneous overcurrent element, the directional time 
overcurrent element trips the line after a time delay. It extends the protection coverage 
(overreach the full length of line) of the directional instantaneous overcurrent element by 
coordinating with the protection functions at the remote bus on the basis of operating time. 
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For any external fault the operating time of remote relay is set less than the operating time 
of local directional time overcurrent element so that the fault is cleared before the local 
relay operates. 
 
Figure 2-4 Directional Time Overcurrent Line Protection 
 
Figure 2-5 Directional Time Overcurrent Characteristic 
 
However the disadvantages still stem from the setting and coordination: 1) for long 
transmission lines, as the relay reaches further into the remote end, the closer the fault 
current magnitude approaches maximum load current, thus it is difficult to set a pickup 
























current magnitude approaches maximum unbalanced load, thus it is difficult to set a pickup 
value to differentiate fault and heavy load with non-transposed line for ground element. 2) 
if the remote bus has a load, then the current measured at local relay would be higher than 
that of remote relay, making it extremely difficult to coordinate. 3) variations in system 
operating conditions can affect both the settings and coordination. 
2.3.3 Stepped Distance Protection 
The major advantage of distance relays compared to direction IOC/TOC relays is its 
ability to operate for fault currents near or less than maximum load current and relative 
immune to system operating conditions and fault current levels. Distance relays track the 
apparent impedance looking into a transmission line, and operate when the impedance 
enters a pre-specified locus. A standardized distance relay is designed such that when a 
fault occurs, the apparent impedance is approximately equal to the positive sequence 
impedance of the circuit per unit length times the distance to the fault. The most classical 
electromechanical relay being balanced beam type where the operating region is a circle 
on the R-X diagram, and microprocessor based relays either mimic the behavior, or better 
shape the operating region, such as Mho, lenticular, quadrilateral shapes that are 
implemented by major manufacturers (ABB [13], SEL [14], and GE [15]). Six elements 
are needed for phase-phase faults and phase-ground faults. For typical step distance 
protection practices, three zones are usually used. Zone 1 covers 80% of the line (the 
apparent impedance reach is set as 80% of the positive sequence impedance of the total 
line) so that transients and CT/PT errors would not overreach the protected zone. There is 
no intentional delay for the trip logic so that zone 1 uses instantaneous tripping. Zone 2 
covers 125% of the line and 20 cycles of delay is used to coordinate with other fast tripping 
17 
 
relays. Zone 3 is set to reach 100% of the line plus 150% of the next line with 30 cycles 
delay.  
 
Figure 2-6 Stepped Distance Line Protection 
 
Figure 2-7 Stepped Distance Protection Operating Characteristic 
 
The disadvantages of distance relays are that 1) it’s likely that for an internal fault the 
relays at the two ends see the impedance in different zones and thus will not trip 
simultaneously, 2) for close-in faults where the voltage is very small, a self-polarized mho 

























will be jeopardized [16]. Currently major manufacturers use memorized voltage for this 
issue. 3) it’s difficult to apply this function to long transmission lines where series capacitor 
compensation is used, since a) faults in close vicinity of series capacitor where the 
reactance from relay to the fault is capacitive can create voltage and current inversion that 
lead to false direction discrimination, b) the series capacitor modifies the line impedance 
that the relay measures and it’s likely to make mho element overreach, c) the subharmonic-
frequency oscillations cause the impedance estimation to oscillate [17]. Other practical 
issues include a) load encroachment where a heavy load with low power factor may 
encroach zone 3 element, a load encroachment logic is usually implemented by further 
shaping the operating region [13]-[15], b) mutual coupling induces voltages on the faulted 
and unfaulted lines zero sequence network and may alter the relay reach on ground 
elements—if the currents in both lines are in same direction the ground distance element 
would under reach, if the currents are in opposite direction the ground distance element 
would overreach. The first solution is to modify the compensation factor that consider 
mutual coupling effect, however the factor should be different values when the coupled 
healthy line is either in service, out of service but not grounded, and out of service but 
grounded [18]. Another solution is to use the zero-sequence current from the coupled line, 
however the current information may not be available when the coupled line is out of 
service [18]. c) tapped lines that are common in sub-transmission lines due to economic 
reasons provide in-feed current that would under reach, or out-feed current that would 
overreach when source of generation or grounded neutral wye-delta transformer exist 
behind the tap [19]. d) fault resistance introduces an error in the distance estimation, and a 
popular solution is to use quadrilateral tripping zone to obtain a better fault resistance 
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coverage and arc compensation [20], however the fault resistance coverage is limited by 
the maximum line loading, which may cause relay misoperation for faults with high-fault 
resistance value [21]. e) during power swings the measured positive sequence impedance 
trajectory may traverse the operating region of a distance element and cause a misoperation. 
Traditional power swing blocking logic uses dual-blinder characteristics that measures the 
time it takes for the positive sequence impedance to cross the outer and inner blinders, or 
concentric dual-quadrilateral characteristics [22], however long and heavily loaded line 
make it difficult to set the blinders. 
2.3.4 Pilot Protection 
Neither directional instantaneous overcurrent, directional time overcurrent nor 
distance relay provides the possibilities of high-speed simultaneous clearing of the fault at 
the two ends of transmission line protected zone. They require zone 2 coordination for 100% 
cover of the protected zone. Pilot relaying are introduced for such purpose. It is an 
alternative to differential protection for which the limited or processed information at the 
remote terminal are brought to the local relay by a communication channel, and comparison 
is made with local information. By information compared, pilot schemes can be 
categorized into 1) directional (power flow) comparison type as most widely used [22], 2) 
unit type by using current information only. Direction comparison systems compare the 
direction of fault current flow at the two line terminals, and declare internal fault if there is 
no agreement in flow direction between the line terminals. By tripping logic, pilot schemes 
can be categorized into 1) blocking mode, 2) tripping mode. A blocking mode is one in 
which the presence of a transmitted signal prevents tripping of a circuit breaker and a 
tripping mode is one in which the signal initiates tripping a circuit breaker. The 
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communication media includes 1) pilot wires for 50 or 60 Hz transmission, typically a 
15kV twisted pair of telephone cables, AWG#19 and appropriated shielded. The problems 
experienced is induction from lightning or parallel power circuit [6]. 2) audio frequency 
tones (telephone line) in the range of 1000-3000 Hz from leased telephone facilities, 3) 
power line carrier, where radio frequencies between 30 and 300 kHz were superimposed 
on the power lines. The line tuner cancels the coupling capacitance and provides a low-
impedance path for efficient transfer of RF signals to and from the other terminal. PLC 
were originally used in an on-off mode and as time progressed frequency-shift mode 
became available. In the United States phase-to-ground coupling is most commonly used. 
4) microwave in the range of 150 MHz and 20 GHz,  and 5) digital channel usually in optic 
fiber that’s becoming the communication link of choice. 
 






















Traditionally, pilot schemes were designed to operate over a specific media. It is 
illustrated in the following.  
Directional Comparison Blocking by power line carrier in on/off mode – is the most 
widely used pilot scheme [23], the main reason being the low communication channel 
requirements. The relays at two terminals compare the direction of the power flow, and the 
blocking signal is transmitted only when a fault occurs in reverse direction at one terminal. 
DCB favors dependability over security because it does not depend on channel for tripping 
for internal fault, but it risks overtripping for external faults when block signal is delayed 
or lost. Another disadvantage is that the communication channel is normally off so periodic 
checking is required. 
Directional Comparison Unblocking was developed when power line carrier on 
frequency-shift mode became available. Relays at both terminals only key the transmitters 
to unblocking mode (or transfer tripping) when forward fault is ‘seen’, or otherwise stay at 
blocking mode (or guard). It resolves the security issue from DCB scheme because a 
monitoring signal is continuously sent over the channel during normal operation, so relays 
at both terminals would be locked out if channel is lost [6]. Another advantage is that if the 
unblocking signal is delayed during internal fault, the relay can still trip. The disadvantage 
being it requires a duplex communications channel. 
A tripping scheme is a viable option when communication channel is independent of 
the power line, such as audio tones and microwave. Permissive schemes are inherently 
more secure but less dependable than blocking schemes. Direct Underreach Transfer Trip 
scheme is the simplest application of tripping scheme. During normal operation guard 
signal is transmitted, and the relay at each terminal will directly trip when it ‘sees’ a 
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forward fault (and sends trip signal to the other end), or will trip upon arrival of trip signal 
from the other end. Such system is not in general use because of the very high security 
requirements of the channels, as any transient or spurious operation of the receiver will 
result in incorrect operation [6]. As a consequence, an overreaching fault detector is added 
to supervise the channel to provide more security, as known as the Permissive Underreach 
Transfer Trip scheme. Both underreach schemes share a common disadvantage such that 
when the remote terminal is open, or has weak infeed, then the local terminal is not able to 
protect the full line. 
Permissive Overreach Transfer Trip uses overreach fault detectors. Similar to DCUB, 
relays at both terminals only key the transmitters to transfer trip mode when forward fault 
is ‘seen’, or otherwise stay at guard mode. It would trip only if both fault detector is asserted 
and trip signal is received. The only difference is DCUB also has logic when both guard 
and trip signal are not received, i.e. channel lost that deals specifically with PLC.  
The inherent disadvantage for overreach fault detectors in POTT, DCB and DCUB is 
current reversal that result in a sequential trip operation [6]. A typical solution by 
manufacturers (ABB [13]) is current reversal logic where a reverse element (zone 3) is 
used to detect when the fault is initially seen behind the relay, and a dropout delay prevents 
the relay from keying permission upon a transition from reverse to forward [24]. The 
inherent disadvantage for pilot schemes except DCB is weak-infeed source when the relay 
at the weak source terminal will not operate due to insufficient energy until the breaker at 
the other terminal opens, and also open terminal scenario. A typical solution by 
manufacturers (ABB [13]) is weak-end infeed logic that echo back the received signal 
when no fault is ‘seen’ in both forward and reverse direction. Lastly, all directional 
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comparison schemes require voltage information, that may subject to loss of voltage for 
close-in fault, blown fuses, ferroresonance problems in voltage transformers, and transient 
response problems associated with capacitive-coupled voltage transformers [25]. 
2.3.5 Line Differential Protection 
Compared to pilot schemes, unit type protection uses current information only and 
does not rely on voltage information to decide directionality [26]. Phase comparison 
scheme was mostly used for short lines. PC can be implemented on both pilot wires where 
analog information is transmitted, or on audio tones where digital information is 
transmitted. PC compares the phase angle of local current and remote current, where in-
phase represents load flow or through fault, and out-of-phase represents internal fault. For 
pilot wires, it transmits an analog signal that is a mix of sequence current to save channel 
capacity [27], the restraint coil carries the local current and tends to prevent relay trip, while 
the operating coil carries the differential current and tends to produce relay operation. For 
audio tones, it transmits only two of states: either the sending waveform is in positive half 
cycle, or in negative half cycle. The relay coincides the local states with remote states. With 
increased communication capacity, segregated phase comparison and dual phase 
comparison are also available. Other schemes include charge comparison [28] and wave 
comparison. The advantage is that they do not require synchronization of individual relays. 




Figure 2-9 Current Differential Line Protection 
 
The true current differential protection scheme compares both magnitude and phase. 
Here all the electric current quantities entering and leaving the protected zone are compared 
by the protection function. If the net current between all the various circuits is zero, it is 
assumed no internal fault exists, otherwise the associated relays would be operated [6]. 
Specifically, two major types of algorithms (with various forms) are implemented by major 
vendors. The first type works with operating/restraint current and the trip characteristic is 
a dual slope line, the restraint region is under the line while the operating region is above 
the line Figure 2-10. The operating current is defined as the net current entering the 
protection zone from all terminals for each phase. Ideally the operating current is zero 
except internal fault. However, it may also be generated during external fault conditions 
due to CT saturation. To provide stability for through fault conditions, the restraint current 
is used to distinguish between fault currents and measurement errors in current 
transformers. The first variation of restraint current is defined as the measured phase 
current of the largest magnitude in any line end [29] by ABB, and the second variation is 













would trigger trip element if the operating condition falls into the operating region. 
However, this algorithm does not reflect the magnitude error (from CT saturation) and 
phase error (from CT saturation, channel asymmetry) respectively. The second type works 
with complex ratio of remote/local current on alpha plane [31] by SEL. If the vector ratio 
falls outside the restraint region and the differential current exceeds a threshold, the relay 
operates. The setting of radius reflects the magnitude error and the setting of angle reflects 
the phase error. Both algorithms are implemented on segregated phase elements (Alstom 
[30]), while some vendors also implement sequence elements to allow phase element to be 
set more sensitive (above load) for multi-phase faults. Specifically, GE [5] and Siemens 
[32] implements zero sequence element, ABB [29] implements negative sequence element, 











Figure 2-10 Two Popular Current Differential Algorithms (a) dual slope (b) alpha 
plane [29]-[31] 
 
Differential protection is advantageous such that it doesn’t require coordination 
between relays, it’s also superior to other protection functions in terms of selectivity and 
speed. However, from application perspective, a proper restraining technique (setting) is 
required to ensure security against sensitivity, i.e., the many sources of error for ultra-
sensitive operating signals, such errors include CT saturation (particularly in dual breaker 
application where both CTs become differently saturated) and line charging current. The 
steady state line charging current can be compensated by using voltage information. The 
CT saturation effect on operating current can be counteracted by increasing restraint 
current dynamically on phase elements [5] ,[32]. However such restraining also reduce the 
sensitivity to high resistance faults which draw small fault currents that blend with load 
currents. A typical solution is to use sequence element to provide more sensitivity while 











infinite sensitivity for resistive ground faults. However, the sequence element is much less 
stable than phase element so that it has to be blocked during CT saturation, and high 
resistive multi-phase fault may not be picked up by any element.  
Also from relay design perspective, the geographically dispersed differential element 
brings challenge on data synchronization and the amount of data exchanged (channels are 
usually limited by bandwidth for 64kbps, and therefore only limited data can be exchanged) 
[33]. To facilitate the line differential function, the local current data must be sent to the 
remote terminals, each relay that receives a full set of data from its remote peers can time 
align the data and perform differential trip equations. Some relays exchange samples of 
currents [29], [31], some relays exchange current phasors [5],[30],[32]. When exchanging 
current samples, the system can collect at a rate that is high enough for accurate 
interpolation (1kHZ), the data synchronization can be achieved by measuring the data 
latency between the remote and local relays and interpolating the remote current samples 
to align them with local current samples. Traditionally, a channel-based synchronization 
known as ping-pong algorithm is used to estimate clock offset between two relays working 
via a communications channel, the relay sample clock does not have to be synchronized, 
but it resamples (interpolation) based on calculated clock offset. However, clock offset can 
only be calculated if the channel is symmetrical, which would not be the case when 
dedicated channel (direct fiber) is too expensive, and multiplexed channel (SONET, SDH) 
is used. When exchanging current phasors, twice the bandwidth is needed for real and 
imaginary part of the phasor, such that exchanging rate may not be high enough for 
interpolation, in that case the relay sampling clocks must be synchronized. A time drift of 
1 microsecond correspond to 0.02 degree, and typical requirement for time alignment is 
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within 1 microsecond. The typical solution to both problems is external GPS or IRIG-B 
synchronization. 
In modern substation architecture where external synchronization is used, typically 
one GPS antenna/receiver is used, and intelligent electronic devices (IED) such as SEL 
2407 satellite clock, can be synchronized via the GPS signal, and redistribute IRIG-B (both 
modulated and unmodulated) and PPS signal into other IEDs such as protective relays that 
needs synchronization. With the advancement of synchronization technology, a computer 
network based protocol, namely as Precision Time Protocol, or IEEE 1588 version 2, is 
also picking up the steam. It achieves the clock accuracy in the sub-microsecond (typically 
500 nanoseconds) range, that describes a hierarchical master-slave architecture for clock 
distribution. An ordinary clock is a device with a single network connection and it acts as 
either source (grandmaster) clock or destination (slave) clock. A boundary clock has 
multiple network connections and it accurately synchronize the network segments it 




2.4 Survey of Fault Detection and Identification Algorithms 
The process fault detection based on state estimation methods applied to a general 
engineering system is first described in early 1980s and summarized in [35]. Previous 
supervision of technical processes was restricted to checking directly measurable variables 
for upward or downward transgression of fixed limits or trends, similar to the five 
protection functions described above. Other than that, the fault detection methods can be 
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divided as being mainly based on the following quantities 1) non-measurable state 
variables, see Figure 2-11, 2) non-measurable process parameters, see Figure 2-12, by 
assuming that faults in the system would be reflected in a change of the parameters in the 
system model, an example is the slow degradation of system components, 3) non-
measurable characteristic quantities. A survey on failure detection by 1) was given by 
Willsky [36], the problem of failure detection is concerned with the detection of abrupt 
changes in a system, as modeled in state space. Such abrupt changes can arise in a number 
of ways. For example, in aerospace applications, one is concerned with the failure of 
control actuators and surfaces. Such abrupt changes can manifest themselves as shifts in 
the control gain matrix, increased process noise, or as a bias, all categorized as actuator 
failure, and also there might be sensor failure. As a matter of fact, any model changes in 
observed system may be considered as actuator or sensor failure even though they have 
nothing to do with actuator or sensor. There are four failure detection methods with non-
measurable state variables: 
1) fault sensitive filter, where the feedback matrix H is chosen so that particular fault 
modes manifest themselves as residuals in a fixed direction, or in a fixed plane, which is a 
deterministic approach. A class of detector filters was developed by Beard [37] and Jones 
[38]. Consider the continuous time, time-invariant, deterministic system model 
  ( ) ( ) ( )x t Ax t Bu t   (2.1) 
 
  ( ) ( )z t Cx t  (2.2) 
and design a filter of the system 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
d
x t Ax t D z t Cx t Bu t
dt
     (2.3) 
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and the primary criterion in the choice of gain matrix D is not that (2.3) provide is 
good estimate of x, as it is with observers or optimal estimators, but rather that effect of 
certain failures is accentuated in the filter residual 
 ˆ( ) ( ) ( )r t z t Cx t   (2.4) 
The basic idea is to choose D so that particular failure modes for the system manifest 
themselves as residuals which remain in a fixed direction or in a fixed plane. Suppose we 
wish to detect a failure of the ith actuator. If we assume the failure takes the form of a 
constant bias, our state equation becomes 
 ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ( )i ix t Ax t B u t ve Ax t Bu t vb       (2.5) 
where ei is the ith standard basis vector, bi is the ith column of B. Suppose we consider 
the case of full state measurement, i.e., C = I, in this case we obtain a differential equation 
of the residual 
 ( ) [ ] ( ) ir t A D r t vb    (2.6) 













    (2.7) 
Thus, as the effect of the initial condition dies out, r(t) maintains a fixed direction bi 
with magnitude proportional to failure size v. If we increase  , the initial condition dies 
out faster, but the magnitude of the steady state value of r decreases. In his thesis, Jone [38] 
described a procedure in which one first chooses the structure of D for failure detection 
purposes and then chooses the remaining free parameters in order to minimize the 
estimation error covariance, although this yields a suboptimal filter design.  
2) Whiteness or chi-square test of the residuals of the normal Kalman filter, in this 
case the noises are assumed Gaussian distributed, and so are the residuals, and the sum of 
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square of the normalized residuals would follow chi square distribution. A test of the chi 
square value is performed to test whether the hypothesis of non-fault model is rejected or 
not. 
3) A finite bank of Kalman filters with a standard multiple hypothesis testing that the 
systems most likely respond to one of the assumed models with hypothesized faults 
included. Filters for each of the models are constructed, and the innovations from the 
various filters are used to compute the conditional probability that each system model is 
the correct one. 
4) A generalized likelihood ratio test which results in a correlation of the observed 
residuals with the precomputed filter responses due to certain faults.  It is motivated by the 
shortcomings of the simpler chi-squared procedure. The GLR approach, which can be 
applied to a wide range of actuator and sensor failures, makes an attempt to isolate different 
failures by using knowledge of the different effects such failures have on the system 
innovations. The method provides an statistically optimum decision rule for failure 
detection and provides useful failure identification information. 
Descriptions of the last two statistical methods is given by [39]-[40]. 
A more recent survey paper includes all the research efforts within the latest two 
decades, the analytical redundancy approach can be divided into quantitative model based 
methods and qualitative model based methods. The qualitative methods include artificial 
intelligence to capture discrepancies between observed behavior and that predicted by a 
model. A general quantitative method includes residual generation and residual evaluation. 
A robust residual generation is to design a robust filter that generates residuals which are 
insensitive to noise and uncertainties, and at the same time sensitive to faults. Examples of 
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this approach are a) full-state observer based method, b) unknown input observer method, 
c) parity relations approach, d) optimization-based approach, e) Kalman filter based 
approach. Based on the fundamental works from [37], [38], detailed algorithms have been 
developed by White and Speyer [42], Park et al [43],[44]. The basic idea of unknown input 
observer approach is to generate state estimation errors which are decoupled from the 
unknown input disturbance, this approach was introduced by Watanabe and Himmelblau 
[45]. The concept of parity relation-based fault detection approach is to form residuals as 
the difference between the system and model outputs. These residuals are then subject to a 
linear transformation. The residual generation should be designed to enhance fault isolation 
so that they exhibit directional or structural properties in response to a particular fault. The 
residual generation problem can also be formulated as optimization problem, as to 
minimizing the sensitivity of the residuals with respect to noise or unknown disturbances, 
and maximizing their sensitivity with respect to faults, see survey paper [46]. The Kalman 
filter approach can be considered as a special case of stochastic optimization minimizing 
the covariance matrix using linear quadratic optimization techniques. It was first 
introduced in [46] to use innovations generated by Kalman filter and the faults are 

































Figure 2-12 Fault Detection Based on Parameter Estimation (assuming faults in the 




This chapter presented an overall description and related work on the research topics 
of this dissertation. In particular, Section 2.2 gives a summary of the evolution of protective 
relays, current architecture, technologies. Section 2.3 summarizes the present practices on 
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protection functions. The GPS technology is also introduced and it is discussed how it can 
contribute to eliminate the asymmetry channel delay in the current differential protection. 
Section 2.4 provides a literature review of the fault detection and identification methods 
that have been used in many engineering systems besides power system. In general, there 
are advantages and shortcomings for each method, engineers have to fit a certain method 





CHAPTER 3 THE OVERALL APPROACH 
3.1 Description of Overall Approach 
In this chapter, an overview of the proposed approach is first introduced, and then the 
necessary data infrastructure is presented. 
Due to the fact that 1) traditional protection functions cause many coordination and 
setting errors, 2) gaps exist such that there is no reliable protection for a number of 
scenarios, and 3) disadvantages of each protection function as discussed in Chapter 2, a 
new method is proposed. The method has been inspired from the fact that differential 
protection is one of the most secure protection schemes, and it does not require 
coordination with other protection functions. Differential protection simply monitors the 
validity of KCL in a device, i.e. the sum of the currents going into a healthy device must 
be equal to zero. This concept can be generalized into monitoring the validity of all other 
physical laws that a healthy device must satisfy, such as Kirchoff's voltage law, Faraday's 
law, etc. This monitoring can be achieved in a systematic way by the use of dynamic state 
estimation. Specifically, all the physical laws that a component must obey are expressed in 
the state space dynamic model of the component, i.e., device model, in an object oriented 
approach. The measurement from each instrumentation channel is also defined as a 
function of states. Dynamic state estimation is directly applied to the measurements to 




Figure 3-1 Illustration of Dynamic State Estimation based Protection Scheme [47] 
 
After estimating the states, the well-known chi-square test and confidence level is 
applied [47] to calculate the probability that the measurement data are consistent with the 
component model, i.e., the physical laws that govern the operation of the component under 
healthy condition. A high confidence level indicates a good fit between the measurements 
and the model, or a low probability that the protection zone has an internal fault. A low 
confidence level indicates a very poor fit between the measurement and the component 
model, or a high probability that the protection zone has an internal fault. Figure 3-1 shows 
the concept of entire proposed protection scheme [47]. 
This proposed method is general enough to be applied to any power system component, 
such as synchronous machines, transformers, transmission lines, capacitor banks, induction 
machines, etc. However the transmission line is a very unique component worth studying 
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separately, the main reasons being 1) it’s a geographically dispersed component, such that 
the lumped model may be inaccurate, and it’s desired to analyze the effect of modeling 
error, 2) the protection of the line requires synchronization of multiple data acquisition 
systems, thus the effect of synchronization accuracy needs to be considered, 3) 
transmission line is a linear model and the estimation error can be directly analyzed, 4) 
transmission line faults are unique.  
In general, the proposed method can identify any internal abnormality of the 
component within a cycle and trip the component immediately, unless the fault is extremely 
trivial (see case study for high impedance fault). Furthermore, it does not degrade the 
security because a relay does not trip in the event of normal behavior of the component, 
for example in case of line energization, transformer energization, since in those cases the 
energization currents are consistent with the transient behavior of the component as long 
as that’s accurately modeled in the differential algebraic equations, the method will 
produce a high confidence level. 
It is important to note that the proposed scheme will perform best when: a) the 
measurements are as accurate as possible – depending on the type of instrument 
transformer used, i.e., potential transformer, current transformer, etc. and the instrument 
channel, i.e., control cable, and b) the accuracy of the dynamic model of the component 




Figure 3-2 Illustration of the protection logic through chi square test [48] 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Dynamic State Estimation Based Protective Relay Organization 
 
The proposed logic is briefly illustrated in Figure 3-2. The trip equation is based on 
average of the confidence level, the reason to average the confidence level is 1) filter out 
transients caused by external faults, circuit breaker operations, etc., 2) make correct 
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tripping when the internal fault is small (see Appendix A). As a side benefit of the proposed 
method, since the model must be high fidelity, we can foresee the possibility that this model 
used for protective relaying can also be used as the main repository of the model for other 
applications, for example in energy management system (EMS) applications, a positive 
sequence model can be computed from the three phase transmission line model and send 
to the EMS database for optimal power flow, voltage stability monitoring and contingency 
analysis applications, the advantage is that the EMS will use a field validated model. 
The implementation of the dynamic state estimation based protective relay has been 
approached from an object orientation point of view, see overview of the relay organization 
in Figure 3-3, the approach requires the following objects: 1) the mathematical device 
model of the protection zone, 2) the physical measurements that may consist of analog and 
digital data. 3) the mathematical model of the physical measurements, 4) the mathematical 
model of the virtual measurements, 5) the mathematical model of the derived 
measurements, 6) the mathematical model of the pseudo measurements, 7) the dynamic 
state estimation algorithms, 8) the bad data detection and identification algorithm, 9) the 
protection logic and trip signals, 10) online parameter identification method. Items would 
be described individually in following chapters. The last task has not been addressed but it 
is an integral part of the overall approach as in many cases it will be necessary to fine tune 
the model of the protection zone via online parameter identification methods. 
In order to implement the algorithm in practice, the algorithm needs to be integrated 
with data acquisition module. In next chapter, a geographically dispersed infrastructure of 
data acquisition systems that provide the necessary information for an automated protective 




3.2 Proposed Data Infrastructure for Transmission Line Protection 
The overall proposed data infrastructure for a two terminal transmission line is shown 
in Figure 3-4.  The potential transformers and current transformers presents a duplicate of 
the voltages across the different phases of the line and the currents through different phase 
of the line, and transform them from primary level to secondary level. The merging unit, 
synchronized with external GPS, samples and digitizes (details would be described in 
Chapter 6) and the process bus gathers the data. The relay at the local terminal would 
collect the data on the process bus, and the data from the remote terminal through fiber 
optic link. Today most current differential systems work with 64 kbps channels, which is 
equivalent to 1067 bits per power system cycle, or 14 bits per each of 80 samples in a 60 
HZ power cycle. Considering the communication link. Each measurement would need a 
16bit data storage type, and a measurement set typically contains 6 measurements, together 
with GPS timestamp and Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC). This is far more than the 14 
bits per time stamp requirement. As a result, the communication is the bottleneck here. 
Dedicated fiber optic allows bandwidths in the range of tens of megabits per second, and 
multiplexed channels can be requested with a bandwidth of Nx64kbps, as a result dedicated 
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This chapters provided an overview of the proposed approach, each part within the 
proposed approach would be described in later chapters. An infrastructure of data 
acquisition systems that provide the necessary information for two terminal transmission 





CHAPTER 4 MODELLING – THE STATE AND CONTROL 
ALGEBRAIC QUADRATIC COMPANION 
FORM 
4.1 Overview  
The implementation of the dynamic state estimation based protection has been 
approached from an object orientation point of view. For this purpose, the constituent parts 
of the approach have been evaluated and have been abstracted into a number of objects. 
Specifically, the approach requires the following objects:  
1) the mathematical model of the protection zone 
2) the physical measurements that may consist of analog and digital data 
3) the mathematical model of the physical measurements 
4) the mathematical model of the derived measurements 
5) the mathematical model of the virtual measurements 
6) the mathematical model of the pseudo measurements 
In this chapter, an object-oriented, interoperable, and unified algebraic quadratic 
companion form (SCAQCF) for the transmission line model in the power system is 
proposed and the methodology for obtaining this SCAQCF model is presented. The 
proposed SCAQCF model can be universally applied to various protective relays protecting 
different components.  
Section 4.2 gives the general and detailed methodology for the derivation of the 
SCAQCF model of a component from the original model of the component, which is 
described by a set of dynamic and algebraic equations. To illustrate the implementation of 
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this methodology, section 4.3 and section 4.4 give examples of the derivation of the AQCF 
model for the single section and multi section transmission line in the time domain 
respectively. 
4.2 The Derivation of the SCAQCF Device and Measurement Model  
In this section, an object-oriented, interoperable, and unified SCAQCF model is 
proposed and the methodology for obtaining this SCAQCF model is presented. First of all, 
the quadratized device model is used to represent the physical model and it is a preliminary 
step to obtain the State and Quadratic Companion Form SCAQCF device model. All the 
terms in quadratized model are at most second order. The model can be developed in 
several forms. The specific model we use has been developed under the following 
requirements: (a) list all the linear equations for through variables first; (b) list all the 
remaining linear equations; (c) all differential terms only appear in the linear equations; (d) 
list all the remaining quadratic equations; (e) the state and control variables should be so 
selected as to make any functional measurement linear; (f) the interface states must be 
listed at the beginning of the states and the interface states’ order should be the same as 
terminals; (f) the highest order of the model is second order. The requirements are always 
easily met by introduction of additional state variables. 
4.2.1 The Derivation of SCAQCF Device Model 
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Connectivity: TerminalNodeName  
Normalization Factors: StateNormFactor, ThroughNormFactor 
min max
min max
 :           ( )
                             
subject to  
 




( )i t : the through variables of the device model 
( )tx : external and internal state variables of the device model 
1eqxY : matrix defining the linear part for state variables in linear through variable 
equations, 
1eqxdD : matrices defining the differential part for state variables in linear through 
variable equations, 
1eqcC : constant vector of the device model in linear through variable equations, 
2eqxY : matrix defining the linear part for state variables in linear virtual equations, 
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2eqxdD : matrices defining the differential part for state variables in linear virtual 
equations, 
2eqcC : constant vector of the device model in linear virtual equations, 
3eqxY : matrix defining the linear part for state variables in the remaining quadratic 
equations, 
3eqcC : constant vector of the device model in the remaining quadratic equations, 
eqxxF : matrices defining the quadratic part for state variables in the remaining quadratic 
equations, 
TerminalNodeName : terminal names defining the connectivity of the device model, 
StateNormFactor: Normalization Factors for the states 
ThroughNormFactor: Normalization Factors for the through and zero variables 
ControlNormFactor: Normalization Factors for the controls 
min max( ) h h x h : functional constraints, 
min max,x x : lower and upper bounds for the state variables. 
feqxY : constraint matrix defining the linear part for state variables, 
feqxF : constraint matrices defining the quadratic part for state variables, 
feqcC : constraint history dependent vector of the device model. 
 
Each device mathematical model should be also expressed in the generalized State and 
Control Algebraic Quadratic Companion Form (SCAQCF). The advantage of this 
SCAQCF device model is that it does not contain differential terms, and the highest order 
is second order so that it is easy for computers to perform simulation and computation. 
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This SCAQCF model is derived by applying the quadratic integration method to the 
differential equation in the previous quadratized model.  
The quadratic integration method is applied to every set of equations separately in the 
quadratized device model. Since there are three sets of equations, each one is analyzed 
below to show how they can be transferred to SCAQCF model. Quadratic integration is by 
assuming any variable vary quadratically over the integration period. See Figure 4-1 [49]. 
Note that the three points )( htx  , mx  and )(tx  fully define the quadratic function in the 
interval [t-h, t]. The general integration results over time intervals [t-h, tm] and [t-h, t] are 
listed as follows:  
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1) Through variable equations: 
1 1 1 1
( )
( ) ( ) ( )eqx equ eqxd eqc
d t
i t Y t Y t D C
dt
   
x
x u  
After applying quadratic integration, we have 
From time t-h to t, 
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From time t-h to tm, 
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2) Linear virtual equations: 
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x After applying quadratic integration, we have 
From time t-h to t, 
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3) Nonlinear equations 
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These equations are the same under time t and time tm 
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By restructuring and stacking the above three sets of equations into one matrix form, 
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The normalization factors, functional constraints and variable limits are the same as 

























































































































































































































































































































( )  ( )mi t and i t : the through variables of the device model  
x : external and internal state variables of the device model, [ ( ), ( )]mt tx x x   
eqxY : matrix defining the linear part for state variables, 
eqxF : matrices defining the quadratic part for state variables, 
eqB : history dependent vector of the device model, 
eqxN : matrix defining the last integration step state variables part, 
eqM : matrix defining the last integration step through variables part, 
eqK : constant vector of the device model, 
TerminalNodeName : terminal names defining the connectivity of the device model, 
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StateNormFactor: Normalization Factors for the states 
ThroughNormFactor: Normalization Factors for the through and zero variables 
min max( ) h h x h : functional constraints, 
min max,x x : lower and upper bounds for the state  variables 
feqxY : constraint matrix defining the linear part for state variables, 
feqxF : constraint matrices defining the quadratic part for state variables, 
feqcC : constraint history dependent vector of the device model. 
 
4.2.2 The Derivation of SCAQCF Measurement Model 
Any measurement, i.e., current, voltage, temperature, etc. can be viewed as an object 
that consists of the measured value and a corresponding function that expresses the 
measurement as a function of the state of the component. This function can be directly 
obtained (autonomously) from the State and Control Algebraic Quadratic Companion 
Form of the component. Because the algebraic companion form is quadratic at most, the 
measurement model will be also quadratic at most. Thus, the object-oriented measurement 
model can be expressed as the following standard equation: 
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where z is the measured value, t the present time, tm the midpoint between the present 
and previous time, x the state variables, a the coefficients of linear terms, b the coefficients 
of nonlinear terms, c the constant term, and η the measurement error. 
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The measurements can be identified as: (a) actual measurements, (b) virtual 
measurements, (c) derived measurements, (d) pseudo measurements. The types of 
measurements will be discussed next. 
 
Actual Measurements: In general, the actual measurements can be classified as 
across and through measurements. Across measurements are measurements of voltages or 
other physical quantities at the terminals of a protection zone such as speed on the shaft of 
a generator/motor. These quantities are typically states in the model of the component. For 
this reason, the across measurements has a simple model as follows: 
i i j iz x x     
Through measurements are typically currents at the terminals of a device or other 
quantities at the terminals such as torque on the shaft of a generator/motor. The quantity of 
a through measurement is typically a function of the state of the device. For this reason, 
the through measurement model is extracted from the algebraic companion form, i.e., the 
measurement model is simply one equation of the SCAQCF model, as follow: 
, , , ,
,
k k k
k eqx i i eqx i j i j eq i
i i j i
z Y x F x x b         
where the superscript k means the kth row of the matrix or the vector. 
 
 Virtual Measurements: The virtual measurements represent a physical law that 
must be satisfied. For example, we know that at a node the sum of the currents must be 
zero by Kirchoff’s current law, or the voltage drop across any closed loop must be zero by 
Kirchoff’s voltage law. In this case we can define a measurement (sum of current, or 
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voltage across a loop); note that the value of the measurement (zero) is known with 
certainty. This is a virtual measurement. 
 The model can provide virtual measurements in the form of equations that must be 
satisfied. Consider for example the kth SCAQCF model equation below: 
, , , ,
,
0 k k keqx i i eqx i j i j eq i
i i j i
Y x F x x b         
 This equation is simply a relationship among the states of the component that must 
be satisfied. Therefore, we can state that the zero value is a measurement that we know 
with certainty. We refer to this as a virtual measurement. 
 
 Derived Measurements: A derived measurement is a measurement that can be 
defined for a physical quantity by utilizing physical laws. An example derived 
measurement is shown in Figure 4-2 where in order to protect the transmission line, the 
currents through the line is requires as actual measurements. However, since there’s no 
current transformer on the line such measurement is not available. On the other hand, the 
two circuit breakers on the bus measures the current going into the line, as a result, the 
current through the line could be measured as sum of the two currents. See Figure 4-3 for 
another example, the figure illustrates a series compensated power line with actual 
measurements on the line side only. Then derived measurements are defined for each 
capacitor section. Note that the derived measurements enable the observation of the voltage 






Figure 4-2 Illustration of derived measurement – transmission line breaker and a half 
case 
 
Figure 4-3 Illustration of derived measurement – series compensated capacitor bank 




Pseudo Measurements: Pseudo measurements are hypothetical measurements for 
which we may have an idea of their expected values but we do not have an actual 
measurement. For example, a pseudo measurement can be the voltage at the neutral; we 
know that this voltage will be very small under normal operating conditions. In this case 
we can define a measurement of value zero but with a very high uncertainty. 
 
Summary: Eventually, all the measurement objects have the following measurement 
format: 
( )
( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )












The time domain SCAQCF measurement model is the matrix expression for each 
measurement in SCAQCF. The primary data that define a measurement are pointers and 
the measurement error. This model is also created by the computer program automatically. 
The time domain SCAQCF measurement model comes from two parts: 1) time domain 
SCAQCF device model; 2) quadratic integration of time domain quadratized device model. 
If the measurement equation is derived from time domain SCAQCF device model, it 
just pulls equation from the time domain SCAQCF device model. 
If the measurement equation comes from the time domain quadratized device model, 
the quadratic integration algorithm should be applied to this equation. The procedure is the 
same as deriving the time domain SCAQCF device model from time domain quadratized 
device model. 
The above two steps are processed for each measurement. Then all the equations are 
stacked into the following standard time domain SCAQCF measurement model: 
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   Measurement noise error: dMeterScale, dMeterSigmaPU 
  
where: 
z : measurement variables at both time t and time tm, [ ( ), ( )]mt tz z z  
x : external and internal state variables of the measurement model, [ ( ), ( )]mt tx x x  
,m xY : matrix defining the linear part for state variables, 
,m xF : matrices defining the quadratic part for state variables, 
mC : history dependent vector of the measurement model, 
,m xN : matrix defining the last integration step state variables part, 
mM : matrix defining the last integration step through variables part, 
mK : constant vector of the measurement model, 
dMeterScale : the scale that meters use (in metric units), 
dMeterSigmaPU : the standard deviation for the measurements (in per. unit), 
 
Detailed examples of the formulation of the SCAQCF model for the transmission line 




4.3 The SCAQCF Model for a Single Section Transmission Line in Time 
Domain 
In many power system applications, the model of transmission lines is of fundamental 
importance, including 1) power flow (optimal power flow and state estimation) analysis, 
2) fault analysis, 3) harmonic analysis, 4) transient stability analysis. The conditions 
involved in these analysis problems range from the steady-state fundamental frequency to 
switching surges or lightning-induced transients. If certain phenomenon involves the earth 
path, then the earth path would have to be modeled as well. Depending on the actual 
application, the transmission line models can be drastically different. 
The basis of all widely used models for transmission line is included in Appendix A. 
For the application of protection, the model is simplified to a pi equivalent model which is 
described in this Chapter. 
This section presents the SCAQCF for the single section transmission line model. First 
the compact model is presented and then the SCAQCF model is presented by applying 
model quadratization and quadratic integration. 
4.3.1 Transmission Line in Time Domain – Compact & Quadratized Form 
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The differential algebraic equations ruling the transmission line are derived from KCL, 
KVL, and written in compact form: 
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 1 2
( ) ( )
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) L LL
di t di t
v t v t R i t GL L
dt dt
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R, L, C, G: 4×4 resistance, inductance, capacitance and stabilizing conductance 
matrices. 
1( )i t : all through variables on left side of pi equivalent model at time t 
2 ( )i t : all through variables on right side of pi equivalent model at time t 
1( )v t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model at time t 
2 ( )v t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model at time t 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Lx t v t v t i t  
Since the transmission line is a linear model, no quadratization is needed, the 
quadratized form is same as the compact form. 
 
4.3.2 Transmission Line in Time Domain – Single Section SCAQCF Device Model 
Quadratic integration of the above linear model from time t-h to t: 
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Quadratic integration of the above linear model from time t-h to tm: 
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where 4I   means identity matrix with 4 rows and 4 columns. 
The definition of the external state, internal state, and through variables are listed in 
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Table 4.1. External states of the four phase transmission line – single section. 
Index Variable Description 
0 1( )av t  voltage of phase A to ground on left terminal 
1 1( )bv t  voltage of phase B to ground on left terminal 
2 1( )cv t  voltage of phase C to ground on left terminal 
3 1( )nv t  voltage of phase N to ground on left terminal 
4 2 ( )av t  voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal 
5 2 ( )bv t  voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal 
6 2 ( )cv t  voltage of phase A to neutral on right terminal 
7 2 ( )bv t  voltage of phase A to neutral on right terminal 
 
Table 4.2. Internal states of the four phase transmission line – single section. 
Index Variable Description 
8 ( )aLi t  current through the inductance of phase A 
9 ( )bLi t  current through the inductance of phase B 
10 ( )cLi t  current through the inductance of phase C 
11 ( )nLi t  current through the inductance of phase N 
 
Table 4.3. Through variables of the four phase transmission line – single section. 
Index Variable Description 
0 1( )ai t   current through transmission line phase a left terminal 
1 1( )bi t   current through transmission line phase b left terminal 
2 1( )ci t   current through transmission line phase c left terminal 
3 1( )ni t   current through transmission line phase n left terminal 
4 2 ( )ai t   current through transmission line phase a right terminal 
5 2 ( )bi t   current through transmission line phase b right terminal 
6 2 ( )ci t   current through transmission line phase c right terminal 




4.3.3 Transmission Line in Time Domain – Single Section SCAQCF Measurement 
Model 
In this thesis, the transmission line protective relay needs access to the voltages and 
currents on both terminals of the line, so the 24 actual measurements are: 1) Three phase 
currents at both left and right sides at time t, tm – extracted from device model; 2) Three 
phase-to-neutral voltages at both left and right sides at time t, tm – linear combination of 
external states; 3) The 4 pseudo measurements are neutral voltages on left and right sides 
at time t, tm – linear combination of external states; 4) The 8 virtual measurements are zero 
values from KVL at each phase at time t, tm – extracted from device model; There are in 
total 36 measurements and 24 states, with a redundancy of 50%. 
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where any submatrix with subscripts such as 1:3,1:4 means the first three rows and 
the first four columns of that matrix, and 
1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1













4.4 The SCAQCF Model for a Multi Section Transmission Line in Time 
Domain 
When the transmission line is long, the equivalent pi circuit parameters in Appendix 
A are functions of the frequency and no longer proportional to the length of the line. Or 
put in other words, the RLC elements which are proportional to the length of the line must 
be corrected in order to get an exact line model at a specified frequency. For a more 
accurate representation of a long transmission line, the multi-section model is desired. The 
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Figure 4-5 Transmission Line Model – Multi Section 
 
4.4.1 Transmission Line in Time Domain - Compact & Quadratized Form 
The transmission line is divided into N sections, the right terminal of kth single section 
and the left terminal of the k+1th single section part are electrically connected. Let the states 
be defined as: 
 1 2 1 1, , , , ,
TT




kv : (k=1,…,N+1 )the voltage on the left hand side of k
th section or the right hand side 
of the k-1th section (since they’re connected) 
Lki : (k=1,…,N) the inductance current of the k
th section. 
For the through variables 𝑖1 = [𝑖𝑎1, 𝑖𝑏1, 𝑖𝑐1, 𝑖𝑛1]
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For the through variables 𝑖2 = [𝑖𝑎2, 𝑖𝑏2, 𝑖𝑐2, 𝑖𝑛2]
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KVL k k k k Lk k
di t
v v R i t L
dt
      (4.19) 
where , ,k k kR L C  are four-phase resistance, inductance, and capacitance of the k
th line 
(k=1,…N).  
By stacking all the individual equations into matrices, the above model can be written 
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Since this model is also linear, no quadratization process is needed, the quadratized 
model is same as compact model. 
 
4.4.2 Transmission Line in Time Domain – Multi Section SCAQCF Device Model 
The algebraic companion form model is derived after quadratic integration similarly 
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x x x  (4.22) 
 ( ) ( )eq eqx eq eqB N t h M i t h K     x  (4.23) 
 
where, 
1eqxY E F    
0eqxF   
2eqxN E F    
2eqM E A   




The definition of the external state, internal state, and through variables are listed in 
Table 4.4 to Table 4.6, respectively. 
 
Table 4.4. External states of the four phase transmission line – multi section. 
Index Variable Description 
0 1( )av t  voltage of phase A to ground on left terminal 
1 1( )bv t  voltage of phase B to ground on left terminal 
2 1( )cv t  voltage of phase C to ground on left terminal 
3 1( )nv t  voltage of phase N to ground on left terminal 
4*N ( 1) ( )a Nv t  voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal 
4*N+1 ( 1) ( )b Nv t  voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal 
4*N+2 ( 1) ( )c Nv t  voltage of phase A to neutral on right terminal 
4*N+3 ( 1) ( )n Nv t  voltage of phase A to neutral on right terminal 
 
Table 4.5. Internal states of the four phase transmission line – multi section. 
Index Variable Description 
4*1 2 ( )av t  
voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal of 
the first section 
4*1+1 2 ( )bv t  
voltage of phase B to ground on right terminal of 
the first section 
4*1+2 2 ( )cv t  
voltage of phase C to ground on right terminal of 
the first section 
4*1+3 2 ( )nv t  
voltage of phase N to ground on right terminal of 
the first section 
…  … 
4*k ( )akv t  
Voltage of phase A to ground on right terminal of 
the kth section (k=1,2…N-1) 
4*k+1 ( )bkv t  
Voltage of phase B to ground on right terminal of 
the kth section (k=1,2…N-1) 
4*k+2 ( )ckv t  
Voltage of phase C to ground on right terminal of 
the kth section (k=1,2…N-1) 
4*k+3 ( )nkv t  
Voltage of phase N to ground on right terminal of 
the kth section (k=1,2…N-1) 
…   
4*(N+1) 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase A at the 
first section 
4*(N+1)+1 1( )Lai t  




4*(N+1)+2 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase C at the 
first section 
4*(N+1)+3 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase N at the 
first section 
…  … 
4*(N+1+k) 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase A at the 
kth section 
4*(N+1+k)+1 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase B at the 
kth section 
4*(N+1+k)+2 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase C at the 
kth section 
4*(N+1+k)+3 1( )Lai t  
current through the inductance of phase N at the 
kth section 
…  … 
 
Table 4.6. Through variables of the four phase transmission line – multi section. 
Index Variable Description 
0 1( )ai t   current through transmission line phase a left terminal 
1 1( )bi t   current through transmission line phase b left terminal 
2 1( )ci t   current through transmission line phase c left terminal 
3 1( )ni t   current through transmission line phase n left terminal 
4 2 ( )ai t   current through transmission line phase a right terminal 
5 2 ( )bi t   current through transmission line phase b right terminal 
6 2 ( )ci t   current through transmission line phase c right terminal 
7 2 ( )ni t   current through transmission line phase n right terminal 
 
4.4.3 Transmission Line in Time Domain –Multi Section SCAQCF Measurement 
Model 
In this thesis, the transmission line protective relay needs access to the voltages and 
currents on both terminals of the line, so the actual measurements are: 1) Three phase 
currents at left and right sides at time t, tm – extracted from device model; 2) Three phase-
to-neutral voltages at left and right sides at time t, tm – linear combination of external states; 
3) The 4 pseudo measurements are neutral voltages on left and right sides at time t, tm – 
linear combination of external states; 4) The 8*(2N-1) virtual measurements are 8*(N-1) 
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zero values from KCL at intersection of each neighboring single sections, and 8*N zeros 
values from KVL for the loop at each phase for each single section at time t, tm – extracted 
from device model; There are in total 8*(2*N+1)+12 measurements and 8*(2*N+1) states, 
with a redundancy of 3/(2*(2*N+1))%. 
 
4.5 Summary 
The mathematical formulation and derivation of the SCAQCF model for power system 
components were presented in this chapter. Detailed examples for the derivation of the 
SCAQCF models of the transmission line for both single section and multi section have 
been presented in this chapter to illustrate the procedure of obtaining the SCAQCF model 
for a component. 
   





CHAPTER 5 DYNAMIC STATE ESTIMATION AND 
PROTECTION LOGIC 
5.1 Overview 
Given the measurement model in (4.6), the dynamic state estimation problem is 
formulated as the estimation of the present state from measured values and past history. 
Three algorithms are described for performing the dynamic state estimation. The 
unconstrained weighted least square method is referred in [47]. 
The first algorithm treats the virtual measurement as high fidelity measurement with 
small standard deviation, the problem is formulated as unconstraint optimization problem; 
The second algorithm treats the virtual measurements as hard constraints, the problem is 
formulated as constraint optimization problem; The third algorithm uses the widely 
accepted Kalman Filter for linear model. 
 
5.2 Unconstraint Weighted Least Square Method 
The first proposed dynamic state estimation algorithm is a weighted least square (WLS) 
that minimizes the objective function consisting of the squared normalized residuals of all 
measurements including virtual measurements: 
    1Min ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ( , )) ( , ) ( ( , ))
T
m m m m mJ x t t z t t h x t t W z t t h x t t    (5.1) 
where  ( , ) ( ) ( )m m m mz t t z t z t  is combination of all available measurements including 1) 
actual measured value, derived value, pseudo value and 2) virtual value.  
Here the past history ˆ ( )C t h  uses estimated state and measured value at t-h: 
74 
 
 ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )m mx m mC t h N x t h M i t h K       (5.2) 
The weight matrix 𝑊 reflects modeling of the noise statistics of the measurements. In 
this thesis squared value of the standard deviation of each measurement is used as 
reciprocal of the diagonal entries of the weight matrix. Firstly, the standard deviations of 
the residuals from physical or derived quantities are modeled directly from instrumentation 
channels. Secondly, pseudo measurements are only hypothetical measurements that we 
have an idea of their expected value, i.e., first moment, but not their standard deviation, 
i.e., second moment, they’re assigned a large standard deviation that they can reach, for 
example 0.1pu. Virtual measurements are assigned a very small standard deviation, for 
example 0.001pu.  
Given that the measurement models are at most quadratic, the objective function is 
nonconvex. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary condition to the local optima point 
is the gradient equals zero: 
 1( ) 0J x   (5.3) 
The gradient can be computed in the following way: 
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And the solution of: 
 1( ) ( ) 2 ( ( ) ) 0
T TJ x f x H W h x z      (5.5) 
can be solved by Newton Raphson’s iterative method: 
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Specifically, let ˆ ( , )j mx t t be the estimated states at iteration j from time t and tm, then 
the solution is updated by Newton’s iterative method at each iteration:  
     
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )T Tj m j m m j mx t t x t t H WH H W z t t h x t t

     (5.7) 
Where ˆ ( , )j mx t t  is the estimated state at j
th iteration. ˆ ( , )




x x t t







 is the 
Jacobian matrix of ℎ(𝑥). The past history ˆ
mC uses ˆ( )x t h  which is the best estimate of 
previous time step. The algorithm terminates when 
1
ˆ ˆ| |j jx x    , let 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )m j mx t t x t t  where 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )m mx t t x t x t  is the best estimate of states at time t and tm. 
The initialization of the states at time t and tm are the best estimate of the states at time 
t-h, i.e., 
0
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )mx t t x t h  . The detailed algorithm is in  Figure 5-1 for nonlinear case.  
Since the transmission line model is linear (both single section and multi section), the 
unconstraint optimization problem becomes a convex problem, and the necessary condition 
for the local optima is also the necessary condition for global optima: 
 ˆ ˆ0 ( ( ) ) ( ) ( )T T T Tm mH W h x z H W Hx C z H WHx H W z C         (5.8) 
where the Jacobian matrix is a constant matrix regardless of x, 










The solution of (5.8) is straightforward, since the matrix HTWH is non-singular (as a 
matter of fact it is positive semidefinite): 
    
1 ˆˆ( , ) T Tm mx t t H WH H W z C

   (5.9) 
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Read Measurement from 
two time steps tm, t, form 
measurement vector z
t=t+h
Initialize the state by past 
estimated state
Newton s Iteration
Calculate estimated measurements and residual
Compute chi square value and confidence level
Initialization
t=h,tm=h/2
Update past history Cm by various algorithm options
Apply Protection Logic: If average 
confidence level for the past n 
cycles is less than setting, or 
operation limit is exceeded, then 
trip.
 
Figure 5-2 Dynamic State Estimation Algorithm – Unconstraint Optimization, Linear 




5.3 Constraint Weighted Least Square Method 
The unconstraint weighted least square method is particularly useful when there is 
modelling error: such that the measured value for KVL on each phase is not exactly zero, 
in single section models. Whereas in some other models, if the model is accurate enough, 
then the hard constraints might apply. In this case, the estimation problem is converted to 
a constraint optimization problem to minimize the objective function consisting of the 
squared normalized residuals of all measurements excluding virtual measurements:  
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whereas in this case,  ( , ) ( ) ( )m m m mz t t z t z t  is combination of all available 
measurements including actual measured value, derived value, and pseudo value. Notice 
that virtual value is not included in the objective function, but it appears in the constraints 
g(x,t,tm) = 0, so h(x) is only the set of measurement functions containing actual 
measurement, derived measurement and pseudo measurement. 
The solution of this optimization problem starts with defining the Lagrangian function: 
 2( , , , ) ( , , ) 2 ( , , )
T
m m mL x t t J x t t g x t t  
 
(5.11) 
Where   is called the KKT multiplier or Lagrangian multiplier. 
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) necessary condition to the local optima point is the 
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where the partial derivative of L to x is: 
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(5.14) 
where h(x,t,tm) and g(x,t,tm) are shortened as h(x) and g(x). 




( ) ( ) ( )





h x g x h x
f x Wh x Wz





        
                     














( , ) ( , )
( , )
|
( , )( , ) ( , )
( ) ( )
( ( ) )
0
j j
j j j j
x





f x f x
x x f xx
f xf x f x
x
h x h x g h h
x W W h x z G














       
       
       
 
  
         
                      
















    
     





Specifically, let ˆ ( , )j mx t t be the estimated states and 
ˆ ( , )j mt t  be the estimated multiplier 
at iteration j from time t and tm, then the solution is updated by Newton’s iterative method 
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Where ˆ ( , )j mx t t  is the estimated state and 
ˆ ( , )j mt t  at j
th iteration. ˆ ( , )
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 is the Jacobian matrix of g(x). The 
past history ˆ





ˆ ˆ| |j jx x    , let 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )m j mx t t x t t  where  ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( )m mx t t x t x t  is the best 
estimate of states at time t and tm. 
The initialization of the states at time t and tm are the best estimate of the states at time 
t-h, i.e., 
0
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )mx t t x t h 
. The detailed algorithm is in for nonlinear case is illustrated in 
Figure 5-3.  
Since the transmission line model is linear (both single section and multi section), the 
constraint optimization problem has a convex objective function, and since the constraint 
becomes linear, the optimization problem becomes a convex optimization problem. The 
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(5.18) 
where the Jacobian matrix is a constant matrix regardless of x, 
1 1ˆ( ) mx mh x Y x C   



















The solution of (5.18) is straightforward, since the matrix HTWH is non-singular (as a 
matter of fact it is positive semidefinite): 
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 (5.19) 
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Compute chi square value and confidence level
Initialization
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Update past history by various algorithm options
Apply Protection Logic: If average 
confidence level for the past n 
cycles is less than setting, or 
operation limit is exceeded, then 
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confidence level for the past N 
cycles is less than setting, or 
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5.4 Kalman Filtering for Linear SCAQCF Models 
For linear models, Kalman Filter has long been recognized as the optimal estimator 
given that 1) the model is highly accurate and 2) the probability distribution of the noises 
is Gaussian [51]. The algorithm uses the system’s dynamic model, known control inputs to 
that system, and a series of measurements observed over time, containing statistical noise 
and other inaccuracies, and produce estimates of unknown variables. The Kalman filtering 
has had numerous applications in technologies mostly for guidance, navigation and control 
of vehicles particularly aircraft and spacecraft, robotic motion control, trajectory 
optimization, etc. For power system applications, such techniques (Extended Kalman Filter) 
have recently caught attention mainly for synchronous generator monitoring. Transmission 
lines models described in Chapter 4 as linear time-invariant systems, however, may carry 
modeling error. Possible modeling errors include 1) temperature is a factor that influences 
resistance of the transmission line. In practice, the conductor temperature varies in the 
range of 0o to 60o. The resistance varies linearly with temperature within that range. Only 
by gathering the temperature data along the line would the algorithm be able to change the 
parameters of the system model in real-time. 2) the lines along towers may have line sags 
such that the height of the conductors is not evenly distributed, that affects the modeling 
of both resistance and inductance, and in this case the parameters of the model (resistance 
and inductance) would vary nonlinearly with the height. Another factor that influences the 
Kalman filter on the dynamic state estimation of transmission line is that measurement 
error does not always conform to Gaussian distribution due to the potential transformer and 
current transformer: sometimes the measurement error may even be biased. Due to the 
many reasons above, Kalman filter may not be the optimal estimator in field test, and future 
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work would need to investigate the performance of the three algorithms described here 
from any field gathered data. 
This section includes the formulation of the Kalman filter to the linear transmission 
line model. 
For Kalman filter to be applied to the transmission line model, the SCAQCF linear 
model (where Feqx=0) should be converted in the way such that the states at time t (and tm) 
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(5.22) gives the system model needed to update the a priori states at time t or tm from 
the posteriori states at time t-h, from SCAQCF model. And the SCAQCF measurement 
model gives the measurement function for correcting the posteriori states at time t or tm 
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The above equations neglect the nonlinear terms (Feqxx). 
As a result the Kalman filter could be applied. Specifically, there are prediction step 
and correction step: 
Prediction of the a priori states and computation of the covariance of the a priori 
states: 
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Covariance of a priori states: 
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Correction of the a priori states into posteriori states: 
Innovation: 
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Optimal Kalman Gain: 
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Update posteriori state estimate: 
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Update posteriori state estimate covariance: 
 ( , | , ) ( ( , ) ) ( , | )m m m mP t t t t I K t t H P t t t h    (5.30) 
where, 
ˆ( | )x t t h : a priori state estimate for time t given the measurements up to t-h 
ˆ( | )mx t t h : a priori state estimate for time tm given the measurements up to t-h 
( , | )mP t t t h : covariance matrix of the a priori state estimates at both time t and tm given 
the measurements up to t-h 
( | )P t h t h  : covariance matrix of the posteriori state estimates at time t-h given the 
measurements up to t-h 
( )y t : innovation at time t 
( )my t : innovation at time tm 
( , )mS t t : the covariance matrix of the innovations at both time t and tm 
( , )mK t t : the computed Kalman gain for both time t and tm 
ˆ( | , )mx t t t : posteriori state estimate for time t given the measurements up to t 
ˆ( | , )m mx t t t : posteriori state estimate for time tm given the measurements up to tm 
( , | , )m mP t t t t : covariance matrix for the posteriori state estimates at both time t and tm given 
the measurements up to t 
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5.5 Hypothesis Testing and Protection Logic  
The solution of the dynamic state estimation provides the best estimate of the dynamic 
states of the component. The fault detection is divided into two steps: 1) hypothesis testing 
(chi square test and confidence level computation), 2) protection logic.  
1): Specifically, substitution of the estimated state values into the measurement model 
generates the estimated measurements: 
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where ri is the i
th element of r, 
i  is the standard deviation for the i
th measurement, 
thus the vector of normalized residual is represented as: 
s W r   
After the normalized residual vector is computed, the chi square value is a direct result. 
It is clear that when the modeling is accurate and there is no fault, and the measurements 
are following Gaussian distribution, then the sum of the square of the normalized residuals 
is following chi square distribution. Thus a chi square test would allow the protective relay 
to perform a statistical test on whether the protection zone has an internal fault (by the 
assumption that modeling is accurate and noise is Gaussian distributed). If there is no fault 
the computed value should follow chi square distribution. If there is an internal fault then 
88 
 
the computed value would not follow chi square distribution. In general, the computed chi 
square value does not have an explicit and analytical form under fault condition, Appendix 
B presents an analytical example of the distribution of the computed value for an internal 
fault given a simple linear model.  
The chi-square test requires two parameters: the degree of freedom (ν) and the chi-
square value at the estimate (ζ). In order to express the probability with one single variable, 
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where 𝑚 is the number of measurements. After the chi square value computation, then, 
the goodness of fit, or confidence level, is expressed as: 
 
2 2Pr( ) 1.0 Pr( ) 1.0 Pr( , )v           (5.35) 
This expresses the confidence level that the measurements fit the model given that the 
computed value follows chi square distribution. If the protected zone does not experience 
any internal fault, the measurements are expected to match the model, statistically the 
confidence level should be close to 100% (less than 100% would indicate measurement 
noise).  
On the other hand, if the protected zone is experiencing an internal fault, then the 
healthy device model would be mismatched with the measurements inherently. As a 
consequence, the confidence level should be close to 0%. 
2): The protection logic consists of two test: 1) if the operating limits are exceeded (for 
example, temperature above allowable limit) the component is tripped. and 2) if the average 
value of the confidence level over a sliding window exceeds a threshold. The window size 
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and threshold can be set by users. Such tripping model effectively filters any transients 
caused by external faults, while also sensitive and faster enough to detect high resistance 
fault. The mathematical description of this tripping equation is: 
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Where N is the number of cycles in the integration window, fs is the sampling rate and 
f is the frequency of the system. The average of the confidence level is given by summation 
of the confidence level over an integration window and divided by the number of samples 
in that window. 
 
5.6 Summary 
The mathematical formulation and solution algorithm for unconstraint WLS, 
constraint WLS and Kalman filter have been presented in this chapter. Emphasis is given 




CHAPTER 6 LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION OF 
DYNAMIC ESTIMATION BASED 
PROTECTION 
6.1 Overall Description 
In Chapter 3 the infrastructure for the data acquisition for the dynamic state estimation 
based protection is described. In laboratory environment however, building an actual 
transmission line with operating voltage of 115 or 230 kV equipped with potential 
transformer and current transformer is not a viable option, and simulating a fault is less 
realistic. Consequently, alternative options are being sought to test the proposed algorithm 
on transmission lines in laboratory environment. The laboratory setup described in this 
chapter simulates the test systems and instrumentation channel, and depends on actual data 
acquisition systems to perform real time dynamic state estimation, [48]. 
In this laboratory setup, there are two subsystems 1) power system simulator, 2) data 
acquisition system and proposed dynamic state estimation based relay. A power system 
simulator is used to replace an actual power system component with instrument 
transformers. See Figure 6-1, the simulator consists of a desktop that generates digital test 
waveforms. In the transmission line case, three phase voltages and currents on both sides 
of the line need to be generated. The power system simulator is general such that it could 
generate any fault simulated from any power system simulation software, or playback any 
fault happened in field that has been recorded by digital fault recorders (DFR), through 
COMTRADE files.  
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In this chapter, the power system simulator is briefly described, and the 
communication between relay and data acquisition system is explained in detail, finally the 
design of the relay module is presented. 
Digital to Analog converter: the digital waveform from the desktop passes through 
the Ethernet and enters the D/A converter. The National Instrument D/A converter (NI9264) 
contains 32 channels with a maximum sampling rate of 25 kbps. The outputs of the D/A 
converter drive the inputs of 3 Omicron voltage and current amplifiers. 
Omicron Amplifier: the three amplifiers are 2 CMS 156 that have three channels of 
voltages and three channels of currents, and 1 CMA 156 that has six channels of currents. 
The amplifier raises the inputs to voltage and current levels required by the merging units. 
Specifically, voltage amplify channels peak output voltage is 250 volts, and current amplify 
channels peak output current is 25A (for short duration transients) and 5A continuously.  
 
 




The data acquisition system consists of merging units for each amplifier output. The 
data goes through the process bus and finally be collected and gathered by the Georgia 
Tech desktop. The dynamic state estimation based relay was implemented in the Windows 
operating system for performance evaluation and visualization purposes.  
Merging Unit: A merging unit is a device that allows synchronized sampling of 
multiple instrumentation channels and collect the sampled values to the IEDs, in this 
laboratory setup the GE Brick, REASON MU320 and SIEMENS 7SC805 are used. Details 
included in Section 6.2. 
Process Bus: the process bus is a device put in the process level that exchanges the 
data between merging units and other IEDs. In this laboratory setup the GE Cross Connect 
Panel and RuggedComm 2100 is used. 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Relay: the relay has separate module that 
communicates with the merging units, and time aligns the data from different merging units 
(in the line case, 2 MUs) into a circular buffer module, and central processing module that 
retrieves the data from the circular buffer and performs dynamic state estimation and 
protection logic. Details included in Section 6.3. A desktop is used as a relay for 
implementing the algorithm instead of dedicated hardware for the reason of easy 
modification of the algorithm, real-time visualization of the data traffic, and animation of 
the performance of the algorithm. 
Section 6.2 provides the detailed description of the communication flow between 
merging units and protective relays. Section 6.3 provides the design of the dynamic state 




6.2 Merging Unit Communication Flow 
The international standard IEC 61850 enables the migration to a fully digitalized 
substation. The standard describes the modeling of the electrical substation and the 
communication protocols that uses the modeling. The IEC 61850 models the objects in 
electrical substations in terms of logical devices and logical nodes, and the data associated 
with it in terms of data objects and data attributes in object-oriented way, and provides 
mapping to a number of protocols to allow the contents of the objects to be transmitted. 
For any manufacturer to support the IEC 61850 it needs to model the IED using the data 
models from the standard or inherited from it. Current mappings in the standard are 
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) in IEC 61850-6-1, Generic Object Oriented 
Substation Event (GOOSE) in IEC 61850-7-2, and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) in 
IEC 61850-9-2. These mapping are designed for different purposes and based on different 
communication layers, see Figure 6-2. The MMS protocols are designed for system 
operators to monitor and configure the settings of each intelligence electronic devices (IED) 
at the bay level through substation configuration language (SCL), it is based on TCP/IP 
layer, the GOOSE protocols are designed for the transmission of critical substation events 
between IEDs at the bay level and process level, and the SMV protocols are designed for 
the distribution of measurements from merging units to different IEDs at the process level, 
they are based on link layer. 
The SMV protocol provides guidelines and details of the frame structure on the 
transmission of the sampled values, however 1) the detailed payload of the frame is left for 
user defined content. Because the IEC 61850-9-2 was a protocol largely open to the future 
that should not restrict any possible applications, there were many parameters that are not 
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fixed and are subject to different technical choices. The most flexible choice lies in the 
design of application service data unit (ASDU). Currently there are two versions, the 
manufacturer either uses self-defined content in ASDU and other IEDs are only able to 
interpret the payload after extracting the model from the merging unit through MMS first, 
or the manufacturer uses a light edition of IEC 61850-9-2 which specifically defined the 
ASDU payload. 2) the workflow of the communication between MUs and IEDs is not 
defined. Currently there are two versions of communication flow implemented by MUs on 
the market 1) master/slave mode, and 2) publisher/subscriber mode, and the laboratory 
demonstration contains both of them, which are described next. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each of them would be discussed.  
6.2.1 Master/Slave Communication 
The General Electric released its KEMA certified HardFiber system in 2009. It 
includes 1) a merging unit (GE Brick), 2) process bus (Cross Connect Panel), and 3) 
process card that communicates with the merging unit. See Figure 6-3 for graphical 
explanation. A compliant relay or IED sends a stream of GOOSE messages to facilitate the 
sampling process at the Brick. A point in time 100 us prior to the tail end of the Ethernet 
packet envelope is interpreted by the Brick as a sample and hold signal for the IED. The 
Brick digital core samples its data at this instant or by interpolation. The IED can apply 
any sampling rate and can sample freely at constant sampling intervals, variable sampling 
intervals, asynchronously with the absolute time, or in synchronism with the absolute time. 
In this case, for time stamping purposes, the compliant IED is expected to keep track 
of timing of the tail end of the GOOSE Ethernet packet envelope so that samples can be 
correlated with the absolute time. Each GOOSE message carries a sample number 
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(smpNum). This number is used by the compliant IED to correlate samples with absolute 
time. GOOSE messages containing a Virtual LAN tag also “poll” for a set of eight samples 
to be returned to the compliant IED in a sampled value frame. When the poll frame is 
received, the Brick responds with the SV payload. The SV data set contains one sample 
number corresponding to the newest sample in the set of 8. This sample number is equal to 
the sample number in the initiating GOOSE frame. The detailed payloads for GOOSE and 
SMV envelopes are described in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 6-2 IEC 61850 communication stack – overview [53] 
 
Each merging unit has one analog core and four digital cores, the analog core converts 
analog signals to digital signals and presents copies of these signals independently to each 
of the four digital cores using four independent digital data links. Each digital core 
transmits the data acquired from the analog core to the control house via an optical fiber 
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Ethernet link. In the control house, each digital core can be cross-connected to a different 
relay; A single merging unit can operate with up to four relays, and each digital core is 
completely independent of the other digital cores, thus each relay can sample at a different 
rate, can run different firmware versions, and can even be by a different manufacturer with 
different process bus implementations. 
The merging units are usually placed nearby the instrument transformers and fiber 
optics are needed to transmit the sampled data back to the process bus housed within the 
substation room. The GE Cross Connect Panels is the corresponding dedicated process bus 
where outdoor and indoor fiber cables come together physically, and the optical paths 
between Bricks and relays are completed with patch cords. Each Cross Connect Panel 
contains sixteen receptacles for up to sixteen outdoor and indoor fiber cables in any 
combination. Standard LC 50/125 um multi-mode optical patch cords are used to make the 
required cross connections.  
In the laboratory setup, since a desktop is used to implement the algorithm, the desktop 
would be required to initiate the communication with the Brick through fiber optic and 
meanwhile keep track of the time accurately (within 1 microsecond). The startech 
PEX100SFP network interface card (NIC) is chosen to be inserted to the PCI express slot 
in the motherboard of the desktop. The small form-factor pluggable (SFP) is a compact, 
hot-pluggable optical transceiver used for data communication. The Optoway 3702 is 
chosen as the SFP to be plugged into the NIC, since the Brick internally uses Optoway 
3602 for transmitting 1310 nm and receiving 1550 nm wavelength bidirectional single-
fiber multi-mode optics, and the Optoway 3702 transmits 1550 nm and receive 1310 nm 
as pair. 100 Mbps is the bandwidth for the communication. On the other hand, the 
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Microsemi bc635PCIe network interface card is chosen to be inserted to the PCI express 
slot in the mother board of the desktop, this time and frequency processor (TFP) model is 
high performance plug-in cards used for precise time synchronization of the host computer 
over the PCIe bus. The TFP is synchronized via GPS or IRIG-B. Within the TFP a 
programmable periodic output (heartbeat output) is provided. The output frequency is 
programmable and may be synchronized to the 1 PPS signal. This signal is capable of 
creating interrupts, such that the desktop could choose it as external interrupt and every 
time the interrupt comes a GOOSE message is sent by the desktop. The IRIG-B is 
converted from GPS antenna via an Arbiter satellite clock (Arbiter 1093).   
This architecture implies a dedicated point-to-point communication between the MU 
and IED. The compliant IED would be required to initiate the communication. As aided by 
the process bus (Cross Connect Panel), each relay would be able to communicate with eight 
merging units. Since the data is transmitted point-to-point, it provides higher cyber security 
over the second implementation. Another advantage is that this design allows different 
protective relays to sample at their own needs. However, the disadvantages are 1) the relays 
would be required to timestamp the tail end of the GOOSE message when it leaves the 
relay (or the desktop in this thesis). This is usually a strict requirement. 2) the design is not 
horizontally scalable, which means if more than four relays need access to the same 
merging unit (Brick), the HardFiber system would not be able to meet its requirement. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the communication process for the HardFiber system. The compliant 
relay is named HardFiber relay by General Electric, and the merging unit is named the 




Figure 6-3 Example of Master/Slave Communication Mode (HardFiber relay is any 
relay compliant with the HardFiber system communication)  
    
6.2.2 Publisher/Subscriber Communication 
As described in Section 6.2.1, the compliant relay would need access to the model (as 
defined in IEC 61850) through MMS protocol first if the master/slave mode is used, 
otherwise it would not be able to interpret the data set transmitted by the merging unit. As 
another option, the publisher and subscriber mode is easier to implement, as it does not 
require the compliant relay to initiate the communication. Because the IEC 61850-9-2 was 
a protocol largely open to the future that should not restrict any possible applications, there 
were many parameters that are not fixed and are subjected to different technical choices. 
This supports the required flexibility of the standard that makes it future-proof. However, 
it introduces an interoperability issue that had to be resolved. The joint efforts of several 
major manufacturers under the umbrella of the UCA International Users Group resulted in 
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the publication of implementation guidelines for substation applications, which is the IEC 
6180-9-2 light edition. Interoperability between merging units and protection, control and 
monitoring devices is ensured through this document by fixing all the flexible parameters 
and fixing the models of the merging units as described by IEC 61850. See Appendix C 
for the detailed model description and detailed message format. For protection applications, 
the merging units publish 80 samples/cycle or 4800 HZ to the process bus (broadcast, the 
destination MAC address is unique and does not change with device), each Ethernet frame 
has a single set of four voltage and four current samples. A timestamp is added to the values, 
so that the subscriber can check the timeliness of the values and use them to align the 
samples for further processing. However, since the timestamp is only optional in the 
guideline, most manufacturers such as REASON and Siemens do not implement that. As a 
result, the SV streamed by the merging unit are therefore not based on time-stamping the 
samples, but rather on the sample count which is a required field in the message protocol. 
The merging unit from REASON (MU320) uses the PPS information (pulse per second) 
from the IRIG-B to make sure that the first sample with sample count being 1 is always 
synchronized with the 1 second rollover. The subsequent samples are evenly spread in 208 
microsecond intervals, summing up to the 4800 samples per second for protection 
application. See Figure 6-4. The sampling rate is guaranteed by hardware, as it runs on an 
independent FPGA soft-core, and the timestamps in the payload are neglected to reduce 
processing overhead at such transmission rates. As a matter of fact, MU320 supports 
timestamping in the much slower GOOSE message. 
The process bus is a simple Ethernet switch in which case by receiving the sampled 
value messages it simply broadcasts to all available ports. Any compliant IED that needs 
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to subscribe to the target merging unit simply need to filter the incoming messages by the 
source MAC address of the target merging unit. And if timestamps are needed it can derive 
them by multiplying the sample count by the 208 microsecond interval of the current 
second, assuming the computer device is also synchronized.  
In this thesis, either 1) network interface card is used for the desktop to communicate 
with the merging units through fiber optic cable, where the SFP is chosen as Avago 
5750APZ SFP for 850 nm transmit and receive, or 2) a fiber optic to electric converter is 
first used to convert the fiber optic signals to electric signals transmitted by copper cable, 
and an Ethernet switch is used for broadcasting the sampled values, where the 






















Figure 6-4 Example of Publisher/Subscriber Mode 
 
The broadcast methodology has been adopted by many vendors such as REASON, 
Siemens and SEL. The advantage is that it is truly scalable – any IED that needs subscribe 
to the merging unit can do so by being connected to the Ethernet switch. And the IED does 
not need to keep track of the time since the merging unit is already time synchronized and 
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the sampled values contains time information. However, the disadvantage is also clear: 1) 
The sampling rate in the merging unit is fixed, because the samples/cycle are defined at the 
nominal frequency of the system. This is fundamentally different than the master/slave 
mode implemented by the HardFiber system where the IED tracks the power system 
frequency and adjust the sampling rate accordingly. At the same time, the protection 
algorithms in most cases are based on frequency tracking with a fixed number of samples 
per cycle at the current frequency of the power system, and as a matter of fact many devices 
that are used both as conventional IEDs and IEDs with process bus interface capabilities 
have sampling rate different from the 80 samples/cycle. This will require re-sampling in 
order to run the different protection and other algorithms. 2) The data is publicly 
broadcasted through the Ethernet switch such that any other devices can eavesdrop the data 
and compromise the cyber security requirements of the digital substation, and most 
importantly any other device can block the original sampled data, and emulate the 
malicious sampled data to the listening IEDs and consequently alter the protection logic 
and trip the circuit breaker that may endanger the whole network. Currently many research 
efforts focus on detecting the emulating data based on data signatures. 3) the concentration 
of the sampled data from different merging unit can be difficult if there is a data congestion 
in the Ethernet switch, such that the time delay of the sampled value messages is more than 
one second, then the IED would not be able to time align sampled values from two different 




6.3 Design of Dynamic State Estimation Based Relay 
Figure 6-5 illustrates the overall design of the dynamic state estimation based 
protection user interface. The included modules are 1) MU Simulator, 2) MU Data 
Concentrator, 3) Circular Buffer, 4) COMTRADE data, 5) Device and Measurement 
Model Input, 6) EBP Relay processing, 7) Reports. This thesis contributes to the detailed 
technical implementation of the first two modules. The working sequence is to first input 
the device and measurement model, and setup the measurement channels from the merging 
units where the data would be coming from, or the COMTRADE file where the data would 
be generated from. If the data are coming from multiple merging units, the merging unit 
data concentrator would concentrate/time align the data based on the sample number as in 
GE Brick or sample count as in REASON MU. The circular buffer receives data from either 
the MU module or COMTRADE module. The next step is to choose the desired dynamic 
state estimation algorithm (protection logic involved) to start processing the data, and 




Figure 6-5 Dynamic State Estimation Based Protection User Interface (@Copyright 
of Power System Control and Automation Laboratory) 
 
Specifically, the design of the MU simulator is shown in Figure 6-6, the user could 
define the original MAC address and name for the virtual merging unit, configuration 
revision, sampling rate, and to generate the actual data the relative phase angle would also 
be needed. These fields consist of the IEC 61850-9-2 light edition Ethernet message.  
The design of the merging unit data concentrator module is shown in Figure 6-7. The 
relay would need access to the following parameters: sampling rate, base frequency, 
maximum latency, and buffer size. The user could select this module to plot raw data (in 
the main WINXFM frame), output packet reports and error reports. The sampling rate 
allows the relay to create the timestamp for the data. The maximum latency is a parameter 
for concentration. If the concentrator is receiving data from two merging units, and one 
packet with a certain sample count is received while the other packet with the same sample 
104 
 
count is still in the transmission path, the maximum latency tells the concentrator to wait 
for a certain number of consecutive samples before it claims that the packet would never 
be received and mark the data as invalid. The idea is illustrated in Figure 6-11, the first two 
samples are already time aligned, the current incoming sample carries sample count of 3, 
if after maximum latency (which is 8 in this case) the concentrator still does not receive 
the required sample from merging unit 2, it would declare the slot 2 as invalid and increase 
the late packet number in the error count area. Also within the error count area the sample 
count field means the new incoming sample count has a leap from the previous sample 
count, for example if the first two samples are time aligned and the current incoming 
sample has sample count being 4, then there is a leap of the sample count. The sample rate 
in the error count field means the number of sampled data which carries a different 
sampling rate than expected, the unknown MU means the number of sampled data which 
carries an unknown origin MAC address that is not defined in the measurement list, and 
the bad packet means the number of packets that claims in accordance to IEC 61850-9-2 
but has a different format. The program is designed to listen only to the targeted merging 
units and filter out all packets in the network that is not relevant.  
The assignment of the measurements in the concentrator is illustrated in Figure 6-8, 
the merging unit list is shown in Figure 6-9, and the merging unit property is shown in 
Figure 6-10. First of all, the user has to define which merging units in the network should 
this program target to by creating a new merging unit in the merging unit list interface and 
entering the merging unit property interface. Here the user first has to choose the network 
adaptor, since the desktop is installed with two NICs in the PCIe board there would be 
multiple network adaptors, then the program can see all the origin MAC addresses that is 
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uploading IEC 81850-9-2 compliant sampled value data and choose one that the program 
needs. If the merging unit is a GE Brick, this program also allows the user to send the 
GOOSE messages as indicated in the left down corner. After defining all the merging unit 
in the merging unit list interface, the program allows the assignment of the measurements 
in the measurement assignment interface. The program allows to map the measurement 
with a certain merging unit first, and then define which order in the sampled value set is 
the desired measurement, for example in the 9-2 light edition the first four samples are AC 
phase currents and the last four samples are AC phase voltages, in the GE Brick the AC 
input is mixed with the DC input as well. Also note that the order of the measurement 
assignment list should be in coincidence with the measurement definitions in the 
measurement model in order for the dynamic state estimator to process automatically. 
 
 





Figure 6-7 Merging Unit Data Concentrator module 
 
 





Figure 6-9 Merging Unit Data Concentrator module – merging unit list 
 
 





Figure 6-11. Merging Unit Data Concentrator – time alignment. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter described the communication workflow between protective relay and 
merging unit. It also described the separate modules in the dynamic state estimation based 
protective relay. This thesis contributes to the MU simulator and MU concentrator module. 






CHAPTER 7 NUMERIC TEST CASES 
7.1 Overview 
In order to quantify the performance of the proposed methodology in this thesis, 
numerous test cases are conducted for the dynamic state estimation based protection and 
other legacy protection functions. The covariance matrices are used to compare the three 
different dynamic state estimation algorithms under normal operating condition in Section 
7.2, and also the estimation results are compared by injecting noises into the measurements. 
The comparison shows that none of the three algorithms has significantly better 
performance over the other two. Subsequently the unconstraint optimization algorithm is 
used for the following test cases. Firstly, the dynamic state estimation based protection is 
compared with the combination of all the legacy protection functions in two test cases 
including 1) in Section 7.3 internal high impedance fault, all other legacy protection 
functions were not able to see the small fault while the DSE based protection is sensitive 
enough to a large fault resistance, and the limitation of the DSE based protection is also 
investigated. 2) in Section 7.4 external bus fault, many legacy functions would have a hard 
time determining the direction of the fault thus making incorrect decisions. These two cases 
compare the dynamic state estimation based protection with the combination of all legacy 
protection functions, and illustrates the major advantages of the DSE based protection, i.e. 
its sensitivity and security. Secondly, the dynamic state estimation based protection is 
compared with each one of the legacy protection functions to demonstrate the advantage 
of the DSE based protection over the weakness or disadvantages of the legacy protection 
functions described in Literature Review of Chapter 2 from Section 7.5 to Section 7.9. 
Lastly, the specific issues involved with the DSE based protection is presented in Section 
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7.10, including 1) PT/CT measurement errors, 2) modeling error for the resistance, 
inductance and capacitance of the transmission line, 3) synchronization error.  
7.2 Covariance Matrices for three Dynamic State Estimation 
Algorithms 
First the mathematical formulation of the covariance matrices is introduced. Note that 
the covariance matrix for Kalman filer is already described in Section 5.4.  
For the unconstraint optimization DSE algorithm, the covariance matrix is computed 
by referring to (5.5) 
 *ˆ( ) ( ( ) )T T TH Wh x H Wz H W h x     (7.1) 
where x=x(t,tm) represents the states at time t and tm. The hat symbol represents the 
estimated value, while the star symbol represents the  
And the Tylor expansion of h(x*) around the estimated state ?̂? gives the following: 
 * *
*
ˆ ˆ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ) )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
T T
T T T
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H Wh x H WH x x H W
 

     
    
 (7.2) 
Here the Jacobian matrix should be computed at x* but it’s approximated by the 
Jacobian matrix at ?̂?. 
Substituting (7.2) back into (7.1) gets: 
 *ˆ( )T TH WH x x H W    (7.3) 
So that the covariance matrix is computed by: 
  
1
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For the constraint optimization algorithm, the covariance matrix is computed in a 










, 0 0 0




T T T T T T
m T T T
m
T
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T
T T
x t t H WH G H W G H WH G
Cov E W H G
t t G G







     
 
 
          
              
           
       
      










    
     
     
 
And by matrix inversion lemma, the above equation can be simplified to: 
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1
1 1 1 1
T T T T T T
Cov x H WH H WH G G H WH G G H WH

   
  (7.5) 
where only the covariance of x is of interest. 
 
The covariance matrix for Kalman filter is dynamically computed for each time step. 
However, after the estimated states stabilize the covariance matrix for Kalman filter would 
also be fixed. In order to compare the performance of algorithms in this section, only the 
covariance matrix after the estimated states have been stabilized are analyzed. In this case, 
the posteriori covariance matrix is used for the comparison. 
The test system is running in normal operation, the description of the test system can 
be referred to Section 7.3 and Figure 7-2. In normal operation the loading currents for all 
three phases are 400A.  
The standard deviation for actual measurements are set at 0.01pu, for pseudo 
measurements are set at 0.1pu, for virtual measurements are set at 0.001pu (for unconstraint 
optimization method). 
The square root of diagonal elements from the covariance matrices for all three 
algorithms are listed in Table 7.1. The algorithms for the accuracy on voltage states are 
similar with each other. The constraint optimization and Kalman filter are more accurate 
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on the internal states than the unconstraint optimization, and the reason is straightforward: 
1) the internal states cannot be directly measured so that the accuracy for estimating internal 
states is generally worse than the accuracy for estimating external states, 2) the unconstraint 
optimization assumes 0.001 p.u. standard deviation on the virtual measurements which is 
the only equation that includes the internal states, while the constraint optimization and 
Kalman filter assumes exactly 0 p.u. standard deviation on the virtual measurements. If the 
standard deviation for the virtual measurements from unconstraint optimization is set 
smaller, then the accuracy for internal states would be improved. 
Table 7.1 Square root of diagonal elements from covariance matrices – per unit 
 
√𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (p.u) Unconstraint Opt Constraint Opt Kalman Filter 
Va1 0.009721 0.009347 0.009390 
Vb1 0.009623 0.009104 0.009164 
Vc1 0.009616 0.009089 0.009151 
Vn1 0.09161 0.0805 0.0812 
Va2 0.009721 0.009347 0.009390 
Vb2 0.009623 0.009104 0.009164 
Vc2 0.009616 0.009089 0.009151 
Vn2 0.09610 0.0805 0.0812 
iLa 0.013530 0.001215 0.002592 
iLb 0.010596 0.001091 0.002463 
iLc 0.009482 0.001008 0.002337 




On the other hand, the estimation results on the phase A voltage and current 
measurement for the three algorithms during normal operation is illustrated in Figure 7-1. 
From the table and figure it can be concluded the estimation results are close to each other. 
Based on the fact that all three algorithms behave similarly, the following test cases 




Figure 7-1 Estimation results for three DSE algorithms – test system in normal 
operation with Gaussian measurement noise, x axis is time (s), y axis is voltage (v) or 




7.3 Scenario 1 – High Impedance Fault 
This section presents a transmission line example by comparing the proposed DSE 
protection on high impedance fault scenario with legacy protection functions based on 
dependability and sensitivity. The protected zone is a 115kV 80 miles line from node 
YJLINE1 to YJLINE2, as shown in Figure 7-2. The sampling rate is 128 samples/cycle.  
The event sequence is as follows: an internal high impedance fault (1000 Ohms) 
between phase A to ground at the middle of the transmission line (Node LINETEE) is 
initiated at t=0.6 s and cleared at t=0.8 s, the current magnitude at phase A at both terminals 
increase slightly from 400A to 425A; Subsequently an external low impedance three phase 
bus fault (0.001Ohms) at YJLINE2 is initiated at t=1.0 s and cleared at t=1.2 s, the phase 
currents on both terminals increase to 1000A. Unconstrained WLS is applied in both events. 
Only event 1 is studied here. 
 





The compared protection functions and their settings are listed below: 
Table 7.2 Protection Settings for High Impedance Fault Case 
Protection Functions Settings 
Directional Instantaneous Overcurrent 50P PKP: 1400A    50G PKP: 600A  67Forward: 
<0Ohm   67Reverse: > 0Ohm 
Directional Time Overcurrent 
51P PKP: 600A 51G PKP: 30A 67Forward:  
<0Ohm   67Reverse: >0Ohm    Time Dial: 0.1   
Moderately Inverse 
Stepped Distance 
Z1PKP: 42.63 ∠ 84.42 Z2PKP: 63.95 ∠ 84.42 
Z3PKP: 85.26∠84.42    compensation factor m: 3.03∠-
6.28 
Permissive Overreaching Transfer Trip 
Forward Reaching Element: Z2  Communication 
Time Delay: 0ms  Reverse Reaching Element: None 
Percentage Current Differential 
87 PKP: 45A Restraint 1: 15% Restraint 2: 40% 
Break Point: 1600A 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle  Confidence 
Level Threshold: 50% 
 





















Figure 7-4 is a summary of the relay performance for each protection function: 1) in -
a) and b) the black and magenta traces are pickup settings for directional IOC and TOC, 
red/green/blue traces are measured three phase currents, cyan trace is computed ground 
current, since both phase currents and ground current are below pickup values, so they 
would not operate. 2) in Fig. 7.3-c) the relay characteristic superimposed with operating 
points are plotted for stepped distance protection, and 7.3-d) presents the POTT relay bits. 
Since the apparent impedances are outside the Mho zones, the POTT zone 2 element is not 
picked up and permission signal is not sent, both protection functions would not operate. 
3) in Fig. 7.3-e) the relay characteristic superimposed with operating points are plotted for 
current differential, since the operating points are in the restraint zone, the protection 
function would not operate. 4) in Fig. 7.3-f) the estimation results, confidence level and 
protection logic are presented, since the fault is small, the confidence level oscillates, but 
the protection function still detects the fault and issues trip signal in about 0.8 cycle. More 
analysis shows that the current differential would operate when the fault resistance is less 



















Figure 7-4 Relay Performance during Internal HIF, a) directional IOC, b) directional 
TOC, c) stepped distance, d) POTT, e) percentage differential, f) DSE protection 
 
7.4 Scenario 2 – External Bus Fault  
This section presents a transmission line example by comparing the proposed DSE 
protection on external low impedance bus fault scenario with legacy protection functions 
based on security. The protected zone is a 115kV 80 miles line from node YJLINE1 to 
YJLINE2, as shown in Figure 7-2. The sampling rate is 128 samples/cycle.  
The event sequence is as follows: an internal high impedance fault (1000 Ohms) 
between phase A to ground at the middle of the transmission line (Node LINETEE) is 
initiated at t=0.6 s and cleared at t=0.8 s, the current magnitude at phase A at both terminals 
increase slightly from 400A to 425A; Subsequently an external low impedance three phase 
bus fault (0.001Ohms) at YJLINE2 is initiated at t=1.0 s and cleared at t=1.2 s, the phase 
currents on both terminals increase to 1000A. Unconstrained WLS is applied in both events. 
Only event 2 is studied here. 
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Figure 7-5 is a summary of the results for each protection function: 1) in Fig. 7.4-a) 
both phase currents and ground currents are below pickup value, so directional IOC would 
not operate. In Fig. 7.4-b) the phase currents are above pickup value and the directional 
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. 2) in Fig. 7.4-c) the apparent 
impedances enter Mho zone 2 at YJLINE1 and enters zone 1 at YJLINE2 after 80 samples, 
the function would operate after 10ms. In Fig. 7.4-d) since the zone 2 is picked up on both 
terminals, the permission signals are transmitted, and the protection functions would 
operate after 10ms since no communication delay. 3) in Fig. 7.4-e) since the operating 
points are in the restraint zone, the protection function would not operate. 4) in Fig. 7.4-f) 
the confidence level drops to 0% temporarily since the fault causes non-differentiable 


















Figure 7-5 Relay Performance during External fault, a) directional IOC, b) 






7.5 DSE based protection with instantaneous directional overcurrent 
protection 
7.5.1 Short line protection  
Instantaneous directional overcurrent protection usually protects part of the line. It 
compares the fault current level with its own setting. For long transmission lines (such as 
80 miles), the positive sequence impedances are relatively large (such as 50 Ohm), while 
the source impedance is relatively small (usually under 5 Ohm for strong source), so that 
the fault current level is largely decided by the location of the fault – the closer the fault to 
the end of the line, the larger fault current level seen by the relay. That is essentially how 
protection engineers set up the pickup value: they decide what’s the fault current level at 
80% of the line, and set that fault current level as the pickup value. Any fault current level 
higher than the pickup value would indicate the fault happens within the protection zone. 
Any fault current level lower than the pickup value would indicate either the fault happens 
outside the protection zone, or within the protection zone but the fault resistance is high. 
In short lines however, the fault current level is largely decided by the source-to-line 
impedance ratio (SLR ratio). With a relatively weak source, or with a relatively short line, 
the SLR ratio is high (such as 10) and the fault current can be approximated by the source 
voltage over the source impedance and as a result it doesn’t change significantly with the 
location of the fault. The pickup value is difficult to set up in this case.  
On the other hand, the DSE based protection does not rely on the fault current level to 
trip: even under large fault current if the measurement matches the model it would not trip 
the line, under small fault current if the measurement does not match the model it would 
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still trip the line. Consequently, DSE based protection performs better than instantaneous 
overcurrent directional element when the line is short. 
The test case to illustrate the short line protection is in Figure 7-6. The rest of the 
system is similar to Section 7.3 except the protection zone is 115 kV, 4km line (short line). 
The event sequence is as follow: the system is working under normal operation until – 
Event 1, the phase A to neutral fault (0.01 Ohm) happens at 2.5% of the line (from 
YJLINE1) at t = 0.5s to t=0.7s. Event 2, the phase A to neutral fault (0.01 Ohm) happens 
at 80% of the line (from YJLINE1) at t = 0.9s to t = 1.1s. Event 3, the phase A to neutral 
fault (0.01 Ohm) happens at 100% of the line (right outside the line) at t = 1.3s to t = 1.5s.  
 
Figure 7-6 Short line test case – a comparison between instantaneous overcurrent 
protection and DSE based protection 
 
The settings for directional instantaneous overcurrent protection and DSE based 
protection are listed in Table 7.3. The overcurrent protection is designed to cover 80% of 




Table 7.3 Protection Settings for Short Line case 
Protection Functions Settings 
Directional Instantaneous Overcurrent 50P PKP: 1510A  67Forward: <0Ohm   
67Reverse: > 0Ohm 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle Confidence 
Level Threshold: 50% 
 
The protection results for directional instantaneous overcurrent protection are 
illustrated next in Figure 7-7. During event 1 the fault currents on both sides are larger than 
the setting, the protection element would operate correctly. During event 2 the fault 
currents on YJLINE1 equals to the pickup value, while the fault current on YJLINE2 is 
larger than the pickup value. In this case both relays would still operate correctly. During 
event 3 the fault current on YJLINE1 still equals to the pickup value (this is because of the 
short line), so that the relay at YJLINE1 would trip, or mis-operate. Meanwhile the relay 














Figure 7-7 Short line test case – Protection Results for Instantaneous Overcurrent 
Protection 
 
By comparison, the results for DSE based protection is included next in Figure 7-8. 
During Event 1 and Event 2, the algorithm captures the internal fault and operates correctly. 

















7.6 DSE based protection with time directional overcurrent protection 
7.6.1 Long line protection 
For short transmission line, time overcurrent could be used in a way that relays 
coordinate with each other along the transmission path. The pickup value for time 
overcurrent is set relatively lower than the instantaneous overcurrent, and it overreaches 
the protection zone. If the fault happens within the protection zone, it would trip with a 
delay (if the instantaneous overcurrent also sees the fault it would trip instantaneously, if 
it does no see the fault it would rely on the time overcurrent element to trip). If the fault 
happens outside the protection zone, it would also be delayed to trip the circuit breaker. 
However, the time coordination between this relay and the relay on the next faulted line is 
that if they both see the same fault current, then the relay at faulted line would have a delay 
less than the relay at the protected line. In this case, the relay at the faulted line would trip 
first (or the instantaneous overcurrent element on the faulted line sees the fault and trip 
instantaneously), avoiding the mis-operation of the time overcurrent protection.  
However, for long transmission lines, the positive sequence impedance is large so that 
the fault current level would approach heavy loading current level. This is disadvantageous 
for time overcurrent protection since it would mis-interpret the heavy load as fault current 
and mis-operate. The DSE based protection, on the other hand, is immune to the fault 
current level again to provide security. 
The test case for long transmission line is illustrated in Figure 7-9. The protected line 
is 128 km from YJLINE1 to YJLINE2. The line next to the protected line is 40 km with 
series compensation to increase the power transfer between the generation on the left and 
the load center on the right. The event sequence is as follow: the system is under normal 
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operation with loading current at 776A until Event 1: the three phase fault happens at time 
t = 0.5s to t = 0.7s. Then Event 2: another load center is connected to the system at t = 1.3s 
and lasts until the simulation ends. The protection setting is listed in Table 7.4.  
The protection results for directional time overcurrent is illustrated in Figure 7-10. For 
event 1 the time overcurrent protection sees the fault, or the phase fault current equals the 
phase pickup value, so that it would operate due to a time delay. However, the relay at the 
next line should also pickup and trip first. For event 2 the heavy loading also triggers the 
time overcurrent protection to mis-operate. 
 
Figure 7-9 Long transmission line test case – a comparison between directional time 
overcurrent protection and DSE based protection 
 
Table 7.4 Protection Settings for Long Line Case 
Protection Functions Settings 
Directional Time Overcurrent 51P PKP: 995A  67Forward: <0Ohm   
67Reverse: > 0Ohm Time Dial: 0.1   Moderately Inverse 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle Confidence 











Figure 7-10 Long line test case – Protection results for time overcurrent protection 
 
By comparison, the protection results from DSE based protection is illustrated in 
Figure 7-11. During Event 1 the fault happens outside the protection zone and the DSE 
based protection provides security against the fault. During Event 2 the load current 















7.7 DSE based protection and Distance protection 
 
7.7.1 Mutual Coupling in Parallel Lines  
Utilities often use parallel lines to transport large amount of power through narrow 
right-of-way (towers and poles) line corridors. Constructing a multiple circuit line is more 
economic than building separate transmission lines. However magnetic mutual induction 
occurs in multiple circuit lines and in single circuit lines that run in close proximity with 
each other using the same right of way. The mutual coupling induces voltages on the faulted 
lines and unfaulted lines and may alter what the relays “sees” with the possibility of altering 
the relay decision. If the currents in both lines are in same direction the ground distance 
element would underreach, if the currents are in opposite direction the ground distance 
element would overreach. The phase element is not affected by the mutual coupling since 
the mutual inductance only occurs in zero sequence network (explained below). 
To fulfill the statement, a simple test scenario is illustrated in Figure 7-12. Two 40 
parallel lines connect the synchronous generator on the left hand side (node YJLINE1L 
and node YJLINE1R) with an infinite bus on the right hand side (node YJLINE2L and 
node YJLINE2R). The base apparent power is 450 MVA, the base voltage is 115kV. The 
parameters of the sequence network are listed in Figure 7-13, the resistive parts are 
neglected. The single phase A to ground fault happens at 80% (or 32 miles) of the line from 
the left hand side at time t=1.0s and lasts for 0.5 second. The fault resistance is 0.1 Ohm.   
First of all, a quick fault analysis for the simple test case in frequency domain would 
illustrates the impact of the mutual coupling on the computed impedance: 
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1). A fault analysis of this circuit YJLINE1L to YJLINE2L when the parallel circuit 
YJLINE1R to YJLINE2R is out of service is given by Figure 7-14, the positive sequence 













   
     
 
which corresponds to 80% of the line.  
2). A fault analysis of this circuit YJLINE1L to YJLINE2L when the parallel circuit 
YJLINE1R to YJLINE2R is in service is given by Figure 7-15, the positive sequence 













   
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which corresponds to more than 80% of the line.  
 
 











Figure 7-13 Parallel Line Simple Test Case with single ended generator to infinity 





Figure 7-14 Parallel Line Simple Test Case with single ended generator to infinity 
bus – Fault analysis with parallel line out of service, frequency domain computation 
 
 
Figure 7-15 Parallel Line Simple Test Case with single ended generator to infinity 




Second, a more detailed analysis is provided for the following test scenario illustrated 
in Figure 7-16, the system has the same setup with the test system in Section 7.3 except the 
protected line here is a 40 miles transmission line that mutually couples with another 40 
miles transmission line. The node on the left hand side of the protected line YJLINE1 is 
split into node YJLINE1L and YJLINE1R, the node on the right hand side of the protected 
line YJLINE2 is split into node YJLINE2L and YJLINE2R. The line from YJLINE1L to 
YJLINE2L is the line under protection, and the line from YJLINE1R to YJLINE2R is the 
parallel line that is mutually coupled with the protected line. The geometry parameters for 
the mutually coupled lines are illustrated in Figure 7-17, the two lines are basically 
equivalent, phase A conductor for both lines are 24.384 meters high, phase B conductors 
for both lines are 21.336 meters high, phase C conductors for both lines are 18.288 meters 
high, and phase N (or shield) conductors for both lines are 27.432 meters high. The lines 
are 8 meters apart from each other. The parameters for R, L, and C could be referred in 
Figure 7-18 and Figure 7-19.  
There are three events. Event 1: The system is operating in normal condition from time 
t=0s to t=0.6s. Event 2: The protected line has a phase A to ground fault at 80% of the line 
from the left hand side, the fault resistance is 0.01 Ohm, from t=0.6s to t=0.8s. Event 3: 
The parallel line has a phase A to ground fault at 80% of the line from the left hand side, 




Figure 7-16 Parallel Line Test Case – similar to Section 7.3 
 
 





Figure 7-18 Series Impedance Matrix for mutually coupled lines in the test system 
 
 





The protection settings for distance elements is listed in Table 7.5, the zone 1 element 
covers 80% of the line, zone 2 element covers 120% of the line, and zone 3 element covers 
160% of the line.  
The settings for the distance element and the DSE based protection is the following: 
Table 7.5 Protection Settings for Parallel Lines Test Case 
 
Protection Functions Settings 
Stepped Distance 
Z1PKP: 22.35∠82.17 Z2PKP: 33.53∠82.17, Z2 
Delay: 20 cycles Z3PKP: 44.71∠82.17    compensation 
factor m: 2.91∠0.194 Z3 Delay: 30 cycles 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle Confidence 
Level Threshold: 50% 
 
 
The protection results in the complex operating plane is illustrated in Figure 7-20-
Figure 7-22, in event 1 both the operating points computed at both relays are outside the 
operating zone, in event 2 the operating point computed from the relay at YJLINE1L is 
inside zone 2 but falls outside zone1, the operating point computed from the relay at 
YJLINE2L is inside zone 1. As a result, the relay at YJLINE2L would trip instantaneously, 
whereas the relay at YJLINE1L would not trip instantaneously, but with a 20 cycles delay. 




















Third of all, the protection results from the distance elements are compared with that 
of the DSE based protection. In order for the dynamic state estimation based protection to 
work properly, the modeling of the mutually coupled lines needs to be justified.  
There are three options:  
Option 1 –   
The first option is to model the entire set of transmission lines including the line that 
needs to be protected and the lines that has mutual coupling with the protected line, see 
Figure 7-23. In this case fault in both lines would be detected. Specifically, the model is 
similar to the single section model in (4.3), where the difference is that in (4.3) it models 
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the single four phase transmission line, and in the following equation it models two four 
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    
 (7.6) 
where, 
R, L, C: 8×8 resistance, self inductance, capacitance and matrices. 
1( )i t : all through variables on left side of pi equivalent model at time t 
2 ( )i t : all through variables on right side of pi equivalent model at time t 
1( )v t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model at time t 
2 ( )v t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model at time t 
( )Li t : the inductance current through the line at time t 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Lx t v t v t i t  
 
The dimension of the matrices can increase depending on the number of parallel lines 
being modeled. The problem with the first approach is that since the algorithm is targeted 
to only protect a single four phase transmission line, if there is a fault in the parallel line 
(or parallel lines), the DSE based protection would also capture it and categorize it as 
internal fault. Other mathematical tools can be used to distinguish between the fault in the 
protected line and the fault in the parallel lines, for example the comparison between the 
magnitude of residuals by using WLAV in the phasor (frequency) domain, the details are 








Figure 7-23 Parallel Line Modeling – Option 1 
 
Option 2 –   
The second option is to model the single four phase transmission line that needs to be 
protected, and also models the impact of parallel lines, which is simply a part of (7.6) that 
only models the KCL and KVL on the protected line. Specifically, the quadratized time 
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      
 (7.7) 
where, 
R1, L1, C1: 4×4 self resistance, inductance, capacitance matrices for the protected line. 
Rm, Lm, Cm : 4×4 mutual resistance, inductance and capacitance matrices that impacts 
the protected line from the parallel line 




2 ( )i t : all through variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the protected line 
at time t 
1( )v t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the protected line at 
time t 
2 ( )v t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the protected line at 
time t 
1 ( )Pv t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the parallel line at 
time t 
2 ( )Pv t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the parallel line at 
time t 
1( )Li t : the inductance current through the protected line at time t 
( )LPi t : the inductance current through the parallel line at time t 
 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Lx t v t v t i t  
From this model it could be seen that by comparing the three set of equations in (7.7) 
with the three set of equations in (4.3), the first equation means the through current on the 
left hand side of the protected line has an additive term as a charging current contribution 
from the left hand side of the parallel line, the second equation means the through current 
on the right hand side of the protected line has an additive term as a charging current 
contribution from the right hand side of the parallel line, however due to the fact that the 
contribution of the charging current is very small (the capacitive reactance Cm is a function 
of the distance between phase conductors and is typically in the order of micro Farads, the 
change of voltage v1P in normal operating condition is in order of 0kV-100 kV/sample for 
a 115 kV system, which means that the charging current is in order of 0A - 1A), the 
153 
 
practical way is to model it as noise with a standard deviation of 1A (also note that the 
change of voltage when the parallel line has a large phase to ground fault can be very high 
for several samples since the voltage suddenly drops to zero, however this can easily be 
filtered by the estimation algorithm. The third equation has an additive term as induced 
voltage contribution from the parallel line. In normal operating condition the currents 
through the parallel line can be from 0 Amps to several thousand Amps depending on the 
loading condition, the induced voltage can be from 0 volts to several hundred volts, which 
depends on how imbalance the parallel line is operating. If the parallel line has an internal 
fault, its induced voltage on the protected line can be very high (in the order of 10 kV for 
a 115 kV system), in Option 2 one practical way is to model this additive term as noise 
with a standard deviation of 10 kV in the virtual measurements, where Option 3 would 















Option 3 –   
The third option is to model the single four phase transmission line that needs to be 
protected, and also models the impact of parallel lines, which is simply a part of (7.6) but 
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R1, L1, C1: 4×4 self resistance, inductance, capacitance matrices for the protected line. 
Cm : 4×4 mutual capacitance matrix that impacts the protected line from the parallel 
line 
1( )i t : all through variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the protected line at 
time t 
2 ( )i t : all through variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the protected line 
at time t 
1( )v t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the protected line at 
time t 
2 ( )v t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the protected line at 
time t 
1 ( )Pv t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the parallel line at 
time t 




1( )Li t : the inductance current through the protected line at time t 
 1 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Lx t v t v t i t  
In this model only the KCL equations are included. The KVL equation is not included 
if the impact of the induced voltage from parallel line can be very large and difficult to 
model. 
The protection results from the three options are presented in the following.  
The protection results from option 1 is illustrated from Figure 7-25, Figure 7-26, and 
Figure 7-27. The measurements and estimated measurements, confidence level and trip 
logic is plotted in the same way as in Section 7.3. In event 1 the measurements match the 
model and the confidence level stays at 100%. In event 2 the algorithm captures the internal 
fault in the protected line and issues trip signal. In event 3 the algorithm also captures the 
internal fault in the parallel line and issues trip signal. The distinguish between the internal 
fault along protected line and internal fault along parallel line requires data processing on 





Figure 7-25 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 





Figure 7-26 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 




Figure 7-27 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 
system --  Event 3, Option 1 
 
The protection results from option 2 is illustrated from Figure 7-28, Figure 7-29, and 
Figure 7-30. The measurements and estimated measurements, confidence level and trip 
logic is plotted in the same way as in Section 7.3. In event 1 the measurements match the 
model and the confidence level stays at 100%. In event 2 the algorithm captures the internal 
fault in the protected line and issues trip signal. In event 3 since the algorithm treats the 
induced voltage as noise the internal fault in the parallel line is not captured. Very 
interestingly, the mean confidence level during event 3 is 99.5% compared to the 100% 





Figure 7-28 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 





Figure 7-29 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 





Figure 7-30 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 
system --  Event 3, Option 2 
 
The protection results from option 3 is illustrated from Figure 7-31, Figure 7-32 and 
Figure 7-33. The measurements and estimated measurements, confidence level and trip 
logic is plotted in the same way as in Section 7.3. In event 1 the measurements match the 
model and the confidence level stays at 100%. In event 2 the algorithm captures the internal 
fault in the protected line and issues trip signal. In event 3 the algorithm filters out the 
internal fault of the parallel line (only transients). The confidence level remains at 100% 
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Figure 7-31 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 





Figure 7-32 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 




Figure 7-33 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, parallel line test 
system --  Event 3, Option 3 
 
By comparing the protection results from distance protection and DSE based 
protection, the mutual coupling effect decreases the dependability of the distance 
protection function, while by correct modeling the effect would not impact the performance 
of DSE based protection. 
 
7.7.2 Series Compensation for Long lines  
Transmission line series compensation increases power transfer capability and 
improves power system stability. The capacitive reactance usually compensates 30%-70% 
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of the total line inductive reactance. Series capacitors installed along the transmission line 
require metal oxide varistors (MOVs) or spark gap to protect the capacitor and reduce the 
overvoltage across the capacitors. During a severe fault the spark gap would flashover to 
remove the capacitor from service, in this case the distance protection would not be affected 
by the series compensation. However, the spark gap would not operate during a low fault 
current and in this case the apparent impedance would be biased by the capacitor. On the 
other hand, MOVs clamp the voltage and change the series capacitor reactance in a 
nonlinear way, the MOV’s resistance is a nonlinear function of the across voltage.   
The most significant effect is the voltage inversion. A voltage inversion is when the 
voltage phasor angle changes its direction. When a bolted fault happens, the apparent 
impedance is computed by the voltage phasor and current phasor measured at the relay end. 
Without series capacitor this apparent impedance should be equal to the inductive reactance 
per length multiplied by the length to the fault. In that case voltage phasor and current 
phasor are approximately 90 degrees apart and the directional element would have 
maximum torque. However, with series capacitor, if the impedance from the relay to the 
fault is capacitive rather than inductive, the voltage inversion would occur, and it would 
make the directional element and distance element mis-operate. Figure 7-34 and Figure 
7-35 illustrate the voltage inversion scenario. For a three phase bolted fault, if the 
capacitive reactance Xc is greater than the inductive reactance mXL of the faulted line 
section, voltage V and V’ are out of phase with each other. If the relay uses the line side 
voltage V’ the apparent impedance would fall into the first quadrant in the operating plane, 
or Mho zone, if the relay uses the bus side voltage V the apparent impedance would fall 
into the third quadrant in the operating plane and the distance protection would declare it 
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as reverse fault, see  Figure 7-34. On the other hand, if the relay uses the bus side voltage 
V the directional element and distance element would mis-operate as in Figure 7-35. The 
voltage inversion phenomenon would be illustrated in the following test case. 
Another phenomenon related to series compensated line is current inversion. During 
an internal fault, if the equivalent system at one side of the fault is capacitive and the 
equivalent system at the other side of the fault is inductive, then instead of the currents 
flowing into the line are in phase, they would be out of phase by 180 degree, which means 
that there is a current outfeed on the side which sees capacitive reactance. Such 
phenomenon occurs when the capacitive reactance is larger than the source inductive 
reactance. The current inversion can affect directional element, distance element, and 
moreover it can affect differential element. For most bolted, high current faults the 
protecting spark gap or MOV will bypass series capacitor so that current inversion would 
not occur, however for high resistance faults and low fault current the bypassing would be 
prevented, this would be investigated in Section 7.9. This section would only investigate 
voltage inversion.  
The third phenomenon is the subharmonic-frequency transient [17]. The apparent 
impedance being computed would demonstrate a spiral trajectory, the impedance spiral 
decreases until it reaches the steady state value after several cycles. During the spiral 
trajectory if the external fault is close to one of the line side the apparent impedance may 
temporarily enter the zone and cause the relay to mis-operate. Such phenomenon would be 




The test case is illustrated in Figure 7-36. The system has the same setup with the test 
system in Section 7.3 except the protected line here is an 80 miles transmission line that is 
compensated 30%. The self-inductive reactance for the long line is j67 Ohm, and the series 
compensation is -j20 Ohm. The line from YJLINE1 to YJLINE2 is the line under protection. 
The capacitor from node CAPL to node CAPR is the series compensation. The parameters 
of the line are identical with that of the line in Section 7.3.  
There are two events. Event 1: The system is operating in normal condition from time 
t=0s to t=0.6s. The loading is 425A. Event 2: The protected line has a three phase fault at 
25% of the line from the left hand side, the fault resistance is 0.01 Ohm, from t=0.6s to 
t=0.8s. The fault current on the left hand side goes up to 20 kA, high enough to make the 
spark gap or MOV to remove the capacitor out of service. However, the series capacitors 
are assumed to be in service the whole time. The spark gap or MOV is not modeled in this 
test system and not the focus of this thesis.  
The stepped distance protection and DSE based protection are compared. The settings 
for both of them are listed in Table 7.6. The zone 1 protects 80% of the line since during 
bolted fault the capacitor would be removed. The zone 2 protects 120% and the zone 3 




























Figure 7-36 Series Compensated Line Test Case – Similar to Section 7.3 
 
Table 7.6 Protection Settings for Compensated Lines Test Case 
Protection Functions Settings 
Stepped Distance 
Z1PKP: 42.63∠84.42 Z2PKP: 63.95∠84.42 Z2 
Delay: 20 cycles Z3PKP: 85.26∠84.42 Z3 Delay: 30 
cycles    compensation factor m: 3.03∠-6.28 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle Confidence 




The protection results for the distance protection are plotted in the operating plane in 
Figure 7-37 and Figure 7-38. During event 1, both the operating points computed at both 
relays are outside the operating zone, in event 2 the operating point computed from the 
relay at YJLINE1 is in the third quadrant close to the imaginary axis, approximately -10 
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Ohms, the operating point computed from the relay at YJLINE2 is inside zone 1. As a 
result, the relay at YJLINE2 would trip instantaneously, whereas the relay at YJLINE1 
would not trip. 
Also in Figure 7-38 the spiral impedance caused by the sub-harmonic frequency is 
observed. 
 
Figure 7-37 Operating points for distance protection in the series compensation test 





Figure 7-38 Operating points for distance protection in the series compensation test 




For DSE based protection, the modeling of the series compensated line also needs to 
be justified. The reason is that the status of the capacitor, i.e., in service or out of service, 
affects the modeling of the line. If the capacitor is out of service, the model of the line is 
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R, L, C: 4×4 self resistance, inductance, capacitance matrices for the line. 
Ccap: 4×4 series compensated capacitor matrix 
1( )i t : all through variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the line at time t 
2 ( )i t : all through variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the line at time t 
1( )v t : all across variables on left side of pi equivalent model for the line at time t 
2 ( )v t : all across variables on right side of pi equivalent model for the line at time t 
( )capv t : across voltage on the capacitor for the line at time t 
( )Li t : the inductance current through the line at time t 
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L capx t v t v t i t v t   
 
 
From the control perspective, this is a linear hybrid system. Hybrid estimation based 
on multiple model adaptive estimation and the interacting multiple model algorithm can be 
applied [54]. Due to the computation time requirement (estimation has to be faster than 
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sampling), this thesis does not explore the hybrid estimation algorithm. Since the status of 
the capacitor cannot be updated to the protective relay in real time, two option are provided. 
Option 1— 
The first option is to observe that the difference between (7.9) and (4.3) is the 
additional additive term on the KVL equation as the across voltage on the series capacitor. 
During normal operation the across voltage is in order of 10 kV. Thus if this additive term 
is treated as noise, which means that the capacitor is assumed to be out of service, then the 
standard deviation for the virtual measurements (KVL equation) can be set at 0.1 per unit 
or even higher. In this case only model (4.3) is needed to model this line. 
Option 2 –  
The second option is similar to the third option in the parallel line modeling. Basically 
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Where the variables are defined the same as (4.3). 
 
The protection results from the two options are presented in the following.  
The protection results from option 1 is illustrated from Figure 7-39 and Figure 7-40. 
The standard deviation is chosen at 0.3 per unit. The measurements and estimated 
measurements, confidence level and trip logic is plotted in the same way as in Section 7.3. 
In event 1 the measurements match the model and the confidence level stays at 85%-100%. 
This means that the across voltage does impact the KVL significantly given that the 
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standard deviation is set at 0.3 per unit which is a large value. In event 2 the algorithm 
captures the internal fault in the protected line and issues trip signal.  
 
Figure 7-39 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, compensated line 





Figure 7-40 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, compensated line 
test system – Event 2, Option 1 
 
The protection results from option 2 is illustrated from Figure 7-41 and Figure 7-42. 
The measurements and estimated measurements, confidence level and trip logic is plotted 
in the same way as in Section 7.3. In event 1 the measurements match the model and the 
confidence level stays at 98%-100%. In event 2 the algorithm captures the internal fault in 





Figure 7-41 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, compensated line 





Figure 7-42 DSE dynamic state estimation and protection results, compensated line 
test system – Event 2, Option 2 
 
 
In comparison, the distance protection function would fail to operate at one end, while 
the DSE based protection would provide full dependability. 
 
 
7.8 DSE based protection and Pilot protection 
Directional instantaneous overcurrent, directional time overcurrent, and stepped 
distance protection are protection functions that only use local information. The pilot 
protection, on the other hand, is communication-assisted protection that also uses remote 
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information (on the other end of the line). For local information the protection function 
often under-reach the protection zone if it operates instantaneously in order to prevent mis-
operation upon external fault, or over-reach the protection zone if it operates with a time 
delay in order to coordinate with the relays on neighboring lines. For either case, the local 
protection function cannot be certain that the fault happens within the protection zone or 
outside the protection zone. In order to cover the full protection zone with instantaneous 
and simultaneous trip from both relays, communication is required. The pilot protection is 
invented for such purpose.  
As introduced in the Literature Review part, there are many pilot protection schemes, 
each one uses different directional fault detectors, and the protection logic are either based 
on blocking scheme or permissive scheme. However, with communication assistance, the 
pilot protection still relies on the fault detector, which are usually directional (instantaneous 
or time) overcurrent protection or distance protection (zone 1 or zone 2) discussed in 
previous sections. As such, most disadvantages from these fault detectors discussed in this 
Chapter would be inherited by the pilot protection scheme. 
Moreover, the communication in pilot schemes can also cause issue when sequential 
tripping on parallel lines and other switching events happen. One such case is current 
reversal, and it’s introduced next.  
7.8.1 Current Reversal 
The basic concept is this: in parallel line application, faults near one end of a line may 
result in a sequential trip operation. This sequential trip happens when the instantaneous 
relay elements trip the breaker nearest to the fault location. Recall that zone 1 element trip 
independent of the pilot scheme. The breaker farthest from the fault is waiting for a 
179 
 
permissive signal. If one relay trips first (zone 1), and other relay trips sequentially (zone 
2), it creates a current reversal in the healthy parallel line, and one terminal of the healthy 
line may trip incorrectly. 
This scenario can easily occur when ground directional overcurrent relays are used 
because they can often see an end zone fault on an adjacent line. It is less of a factor when 
ground distance relays are used. The reason is that the phase pickup values are based on 
fault current analysis however ground pickup values are usually set as 200% of the 
maximum imbalance of the system. Whereas in transmission systems the imbalance is 
often very small due to line transposition.  
The test case is illustrated in Figure 7-43. The parallel lines are transferring power 
from the left hand side to the right hand side. Both transmission lines are 40 km long. The 
protection zone is the line on the top. For all the 4 relays in the figure (each one of them is 
associated with one circuit breaker), they use pilot scheme which relies on time ground 
overcurrent fault detector. Also the instantaneous ground overcurrent protection function 
is used independent of the pilot scheme. If it sees the fault it would trip instantaneously 
without knowledge from the pilot scheme. The relays use permissive overreaching transfer 
trip scheme (POTT).  
The event sequence of the current reversal case is as follow: Event 1 the system is 
running in normal operation, until Event 2 – a phase A to ground fault happened along 80% 
of the parallel line at t = 0.7s. The circuit breaker 2 trips immediately upon seeing the fault 
at t = 0.76s (60 ms trip time) by directional instantaneous overcurrent protection. 
Meanwhile the directional time overcurrent ground element at circuit breaker 3 also sees 
the fault and issues permissive tripping signal to the relay at circuit breaker 4. The fault 
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current starts to redistribute at circuit breaker 3 and circuit breaker 4. Then the relay at 
circuit breaker 4 sees the fault by directional time overcurrent protection and since it has 
been receiving the permission signal from the relay at circuit breaker 3, it would trip the 
circuit breaker 4. The protection settings are listed in Table 7.7. 
 
Figure 7-43 Parallel line current reversal test case – a comparison between POTT 
and DSE based protection 
 
Table 7.7 Protection Settings for Current Reversal Case 
Protection Functions Settings 
Directional Instantaneous Overcurrent 50G PKP: 4000A  67Forward: <0Ohm   
67Reverse: > 0Ohm 
Directional Time Overcurrent 51G PKP: 200A 67 Forward: <0Ohm  
67 Reverse: > 0Ohm Delay: 20 cycles 
Permissive Overreaching Transfer Trip 
Forward Reaching Element: 51G  Communication 
Time Delay: 0ms  Reverse Reaching Element: None 
Dynamic State Estimation Based Integration Windows Size: 1 cycle  Confidence 





The logical diagram for the POTT pilot scheme using time ground overcurrent element 
is illustrated in  
Figure 7-44 and the details are implemented in MATLAB Simulink module in Figure 
7-45. The computed phasors for the overcurrent elements are presented in Figure 7-46 
while the protection logics for all the relays are be presented by the Simulink scope as in 
Figure 7-47. With the fault inception, the relay at circuit breaker 2 sees the fault by 
instantaneous ground overcurrent element so that it trips instantaneously, it also issues the 
permissive signal. Meanwhile the relay at circuit breaker 1 sees the fault by time ground 
overcurrent so that it would delay by 20 cycles since it is waiting for the permissive signal 
from the relay at circuit breaker 2. The relay at circuit breaker 3 sees the fault and sends 
permissive tripping signal to circuit breaker 4. Since the fault is reverse fault for the relay 
at circuit breaker 4, it would not operate. Meanwhile the circuit breaker 2 is already open, 
and the fault current redistributes at circuit breaker 1, 3, and 4. Upon seeing the fault by 
the relay at circuit breaker 4 and receiving the permissive signal from the relay at circuit 
breaker 3, then the relay at circuit breaker 4 would mis-operate. 
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Figure 7-46 Current Reversal test case – protection results for directional 
instantaneous overcurrent and directional time overcurrent as fault detector for pilot 













Figure 7-48 Current Reversal test case – Protection results for dynamic state 
estimation based algorithm (current at circuit breaker 3) 
 
7.9 DSE based protection and current differential protection 
The phenomenon of current inversion was introduced in Section 7.7.2. The current 
inversion affects distance element, directional element and current differential element. In 
this section the limitation of current differential and limitation of DSE based protection 
with respect to high impedance fault is first investigated, and then the current inversion 
case is also investigated. 
7.9.1 Limitation to High Impedance Fault 
The test system and event sequence is introduced in Section 7.3. An internal high 
impedance fault between phase A to ground at the middle of the transmission line (Node 
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LINETEE) is initiated at t=0.6 s and cleared at t=0.8 s. In Section 7.3 the fault resistance 
is assumed at 1000 Ohm, the current differential does not see the fault and the DSE based 
protection sees the fault. In this section the sensitivity of both functions are investigated. 
Figure 7-49 illustrates the sensitivity of the phase segregated current differential 
function to high impedance fault. The trajectory is the operating point (differential current 
versus restraint current) for phase A to ground fault given different fault resistances. When 
the fault is small (less than 100 Ohms), the operating points lie in the operating region. 
When the fault approaches 500 Ohms (as in the zoomed in figure), the operating point 
enters the restraint region. As a result, the current differential is only sensitive to fault 
resistances less than 500 Ohm. 
Figure 7-50 to Figure 7-53 are the DSE based protection results for different fault 
resistances, it can be concluded that in this test system for the specific fault location the 





Figure 7-49 Current Differential Protection for High Impedance Fault – Trajectory of 


























Figure 7-53 DSE Based Protection for High Impedance Fault – Fault Resistance 
4000 Ohm 
 
7.9.2 Current Inversion from Series Compensated Lines 
The concept of current inversion is explained below in Figure 7-54. If the left hand 
side seen from the generator is capacitive (i.e., the capacitive reactance of the capacitor is 
larger than the inductive reactance of the generator) and the right hand side is inductive, 
then the current in the left hand side leads the voltage by 90 degrees, and the current on the 
right hand side lags the voltage by 90 degrees. The two currents are then out of phase. The 
magnitude of the two currents may not be the same, but if the magnitudes of the two 
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currents get closer, then the differential current would be small, and restraint current would 
be large, which makes the operating point stays in the restraint region. 
The example test system is illustrated in Figure 7-55. The series compensated line 
connects two generations and loads. The line is 80 kilometers long with series impedance 
of 67 Ohms, and the series capacitor compensates 60% of the line. There is one event: the 
three phase fault happens at 50% of the line with fault resistance being 0.01 Ohm. The 













Figure 7-54 Illustration of Current Inversion of Series Compensated Line – forward 
fault [17] 
 
A quick frequency domain analysis for the current differential protection is presented 
in Figure 7-56. It can be seen that the phase currents are out of phase with each other and 
are of approximately same magnitude for each phase, in that case the differential current 
as sum of them would be small, while the restraint current would be large. For phase A the 
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restraint current is 6.5 kA while the differential current is 760A, the operating point clearly 
resides in the restraint region. The current differential protection results for all the operating 
points during this event is plotted in Figure 7-57. The trajectory represents the transient 
behavior of the operating points, it moves from the operating point where the system is 
operating normally to where the system is under internal fault. 
 







Figure 7-56 Frequency domain analysis for the current differential protection 




Figure 7-57 Current Differential protection results for current inversion test case 
 
On the other hand, the DSE based protection results for the current inversion case is 
plotted in Figure 7-58. As can be seen, the DSE based protection correctly detects the fault 




Figure 7-58 DSE based protection results for current inversion test case 
 
Comparing the current differential protection function and the DSE based protection, 
it is likely even though it’s a rare event, that the currents on the terminal where the 
capacitive reactance is larger than the generator inductive reactance would become outfeed 
instead of infeed, and the currents on both terminals are out of phase instead of in phase, 
this would cause the current differential protection function to lose dependability. 
 
7.10 DSE based protection – Practical issues 
The DSE based protection would work best when the models are absolutely accurate, 
and the instrumentation channels have ideal transformation. However, such requirement 
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cannot be met in practice. In order to investigate the robustness of the algorithm, in this 
section several practical issues are discussed that affects the performance of the DSE based 
protection, including 1) modeling error, 2) synchronization error and 3) PT/CT error.  
The purpose of this section is not to mathematically formulate the robustness of the 
algorithm in terms of errors, but to investigate the sensitivity of the algorithm with respect 
to different errors, i.e., if the confidence level would maintain at high values close to 100% 
and not to mis-operate the circuit breaker given such errors.   
7.10.1 Modeling Error 
The parameters for the overhead transmission line modelling in (4.3) are basically 
three matrices: R (resistance matrix), L (inductance matrix), and C (capacitance matrix). 
Each matrix is a 4 by 4 matrix with 16 elements, so that the total number of parameters is 
48. However, these matrix elements are derived parameters. The fundamental parameters 
that are used to derive those matrices are the height for each bundled phase conductors, 
distance between each bundled phase conductors, geometric mean radius of each bundled 
phase conductors, and finally length of the line. During the process of modeling, the 
independent parameters can easily be measured, 1) the geometric mean radius can be 
computed given the radius of the bundled conductors and modified Bessel functions, 2) the 
horizontal and vertical spacing between conductors, height of conductors can be measured 
given the tower structure, and 3) the length of the conductors can be measured as distance 
between connecting towers. And the derived parameters can be computed from the 
independent parameters given the correct soil resistivity and copper conductivity rate. 
However, in real life the temperature may change with time, and the height of the conductor 
may not be equal to the height of the hanging point in the tower due to sag effect. The 
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transmission line conductors hang downward in a shallow curve between each tower with 
the lowest point typically being about midway between towers. Sag is a dynamic 
characteristic, it exists because of the weight of the conductors, and it increases as cables 
heat up and thus elongate. Heating is caused by both higher ambient air temperature and 
by heat generated from electricity passing through a line. The greater the sag, the closer a 
line will be to the ground, and thus the less the height of the line. The actual sag can be 
determined from the weight of the line and the tension, i.e., ductility of the line under 
certain temperature.  
As discussed, both ambient temperature and line sag alter the parameters of the line in 
real time. The dc resistance (or resistivity) is linearly dependent on the temperature, while 
the ac resistance is nonlinearly dependent on the temperature. The impact of the 
temperature to inductance matrix is more complicated, basically with the increase of the 
temperature, the geometric mean radius changes (based on the values in the modified 
Bessel function table), and the mutual inductance would increase (since De=2160sqrt(p/f) 
increases). On the other hand, the line sag decreases the height of the conductors, but it 
doesn’t change the distance between conductors. Since the self inductance and mutual 
inductance are functions of both the distance between conductors and the geometric mean 
radius, the line sag does not change the values of the inductance matrix. However, with the 
decrease of the height of the conductors, the distance between conductors and its image 
conductors with respect to the earth decreases, as a result the elements in the capacitance 
matrix would increase, this could be seen from the fact that the capacitance matrix is the 



































If the distance between conductor i and j’ (as image of j) decreases, such value Cij
’ 
would also decrease, and the elements of the inverse of the matrix would increase. 
Another modeling error is from frequency. With the modeling in (4.3), the resistance, 
inductor and capacitor reactance values are based on the fundamental frequency. Such 
model may not be accurate to describe the system during transients. 
The insight of the above discussion suggests that the approach to investigate the 
modeling error of the transmission line is to assume all elements in each R, L, C matrix is 
offset by a certain percentage in the same direction, i.e. they both increase or they both 
decrease. And for the capacitance matrix since the actual height can only be lower than the 
height of the hanging point, so that elements in the capacitance matrix are assumed to only 
increase by a certain percentage.  
The base test system is the same as in Section 7.3 and also introduced in Figure 7-59. 
The parameters for R, jwL, jwC are included in Figure 7-60 and Figure 7-61.  
The sensitivity analysis of the DSE based protection with respect to the capacitance 
matrix error is illustrated in Figure 7-62. Without any error the single section modeling 
generates 100% confidence level during normal operation. The larger the error the lower 
the average confidence level, and when the capacitance matrix modeling error reaches 50%, 




Figure 7-59 Test system for modeling error 
 
 































The sensitivity analysis of the DSE based protection with respect to the inductance 
matrix error is illustrated in Figure 7-63. Without any error the single section modeling 
generates 100% confidence level during normal operation. The larger the error the lower 
the average confidence level, and when the inductance matrix modeling error reaches 20% 
or -20%, the dynamic state estimation can no longer be accurate and thus trip the circuit 
breaker. It can be seen the inductance matrix is more sensitive than the capacitance matrix. 
































The sensitivity analysis of the DSE based protection with respect to the resistance 
matrix error is illustrated in Figure 7-64. Without any error the single section modeling 
generates 100% confidence level during normal operation. The larger the error the lower 
the average confidence level, and when the inductance matrix modeling error reaches 250%, 
the dynamic state estimation can no longer be accurate and thus trip the circuit breaker. 
Meanwhile even if the resistance matrix elements are all initialized to be 0 (as -100% error), 
the protection results are good enough. It can be seen the resistance matrix is much less 
sensitive than the other two matrices. This also means that the resistive parameters are 



















7.10.2 Synchronization Error 
Most merging units are GPS or IRIG-B synchronized, each device measures the time 
difference between the output of its own sampling oscillator and the 1PPS GPS signal 
providing a 1us order of precision suitable for protection relay applications. Each device 
then corrects the oscillation frequency of its sampling oscillator so that the time difference 
becomes zero. The devices continuously update the correction factor and stores it as the 
absolute accuracy of the oscillator. The samples from the merging units could be time 
aligned by data concentrators. However, synchronization error can still occur due to several 
reasons: 1) reception of the GPS signal by the GPS antenna may be interrupted during the 
course of a day, and the oscillator may start drifting away. 2) during synchronization the 
maximum alignment inaccuracy between measurements on both sides of the line could still 
be 2 microseconds, and 3) the analog filter, sampling and hold, and digital processing 
(including time stamping) for the analog waveform would have time delay. In order to 
guarantee the dependability and security of the DSE based protection, synchronization 
error needs to be investigated.  
The approach to investigate this issue is as follow: in the simulation software the 
simulating time step is set at 0.5 microsecond. Then 0.5 microsecond synchronization error 
is obtained by shifting the measurements on the right hand side (three voltage 
measurements and three current measurements) by 1 samples away. 
Figure 7-65 illustrates the sensitivity of the DSE based protection from sync error. 
With 1 or 2 microsecond the confidence level and protection logic would not be affected 
by the sync error, which means that if both merging units are time synchronized by GPS 
or IRIG-B, the DSE based algorithm would provide reliable protection. However, if GPS 
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is lost temporarily and the sync error increases to 5 microseconds, then the protection logic 
















Figure 7-65 Sensitivity analysis of DSE based protection for synchronization error 
 
7.10.3 Instrumentation Error 
The chain of measurement instrumentation equipment starts from high voltage and 
current measurement point and ends with analog or digital signal. Figure 7-66 [55] 
illustrates the instrumentation channel. The purpose is to bring down the high voltage level 
(potential transformer) and high current level (current transformer) to the relaying level 
that can be measured by electronic devices. The control cable extends the analog signal at 
the field back to the relay house where the relays samples the analog waveform.  
The first task is to investigate the measurement error on the secondary side of the 
instrument transformer when no ratio correction factor is involved during normal operation. 
The reason is simple: the ratio correction factor is generally a complex quantity, implying 
that there is both a phase shift and a magnitude error for time domain waveform, so that 
223 
 
it’s easy to correct the data in phasor domain, but it would be very difficult to correct that 
in time domain. 
Other than that, two phenomena are investigated in this section. The first one is CT 
saturation. CT saturation occurs when the electric current through the CT results in CT 
magnetic flux linkage above the level for which the CT has been designed. When saturation 
occurs, the secondary current is not a scaled replica of the primary current. In case of 
internal faults this is not a problem as the current in the secondary will cause the DSE based 
protection function to operate as expected. However, when saturation occurs during 
external faults it is likely that the saturation would cause the DSE based protection to mis-
operate.  
 
Figure 7-66 Illustration of instrumentation channel – potential transformer, current 




Another phenomenon is the PT transient response. When the transmission line is 
energized or when the line has a close fault to the bus, the voltage drops immediately, and 
the potential transformer may have transient response, and again in this case the secondary 
voltage is not a scaled replica of the primary voltage. 
The ratio correction factor (RCF) is neglected in this section, i.e., to always assume 
the actual transformation ratio equals to the ideal transformation ratio. For current 
transformers the RCF approaches unity as the burden and cable and winding impedances 
are reduced and the magnetizing impedance is relatively large if the CT core is not 
saturated, or the flux density is generally smaller than 0.5 Tesla.  
The short conclusion for this section is that while potential transformer measurement 
error does not have a large impact on the DSE protection results and confidence level 
computation, the current transformer can have a large impact during CT saturation. And as 
a result, the option is to model both the transmission line and instrumentation channel in 
the same time. 
 
Potential Transformer Measurement Error: 
The first test case is illustrated in Figure 7-67. The protected zone is 80 miles from 
YJLINE1 to YJLINE2. The only event is that the system is running in normal operation 
until Event 1 – a three phase fault close to YJLINE1 (0.6 mile away) from t = 0.804s to t 
= 1.004s. The three phase fault causes the voltage measurements on node YJLINE1 to drop 
immediately, and as a result the transient response of the potential transformer can be 
observed. The potential transformer, control cable and burden is also illustrated in the 




Figure 7-67 Test case for Potential Transformer Error 
 
Figure 7-68 illustrates the voltage measurement for phase A at primary side versus the 
voltage measurement for phase A at secondary side (on the burden) scaled back to the 
primary side by ideal transformation. Clearly from this figure, during normal operation 
there is a biased magnitude error and also a phase shift between the original and the replica. 
This is caused by the leakage reactance and winding resistance. The zoom-in figure during 
normal operation and external fault is also included. During transients when the phase A 
voltage drops immediately, it can also be observed from this figure that while the primary 
voltage drops immediately, the secondary voltage oscillates for several cycles. This is the 
transient response, the oscillation is caused by the resonance between leakage reactance 
and parasitic capacitance at high frequency, such that the potential transformer does not 
have uniform frequency response. Typically, the resonance is around 1 kHZ. In this case 










Zoomed in during external fault 
 
Figure 7-68 Primary side voltage versus Secondary side voltage 
 
The DSE based protection results based on the primary side voltage measurements is 
presented in Figure 7-70 while the DSE based protection results with secondary side 
voltage scaled back to primary side by ideal transformation, i.e., without ratio correction 
factor at fundamental frequency is presented in Figure 7-71. Note that the PT error with no 
ratio correction factor during normal operation does not impact the protection results, and 
the PT transient response does not impact the protection results as well.  
The magnetizing currents for the potential transformer is neglected in this modeling, 
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Figure 7-71 DSE based protection result with secondary side voltage measurements 
 
Since the measurement error caused by potential transformer does not impact the 
estimation results and protection logic significantly, the DSE based protection by modeling 
the transmission line only is acceptable. It is to be found out that such is not the case for 
current transformer. 
 
Current Transformer Measurement Error: 
In an ideal current transformer, the primary to secondary current ratio is independent 
of primary current magnitude, frequency, and burden resistor value. However actual 
devices deviate from this behavior due to several causes, namely: 1) winding resistance, 2) 
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leakage impedance, 3) magnetizing impedance, 4) core hysteresis and saturation, 5) 
parasitic capacitance. 
The CT magnetic core exhibits a nonlinear relationship between the magnetic field 
intensity and the magnetic flux density. This results into a nonlinear relationship between 
the magnetizing current and the flux linkage (or the induced voltage). When saturation 
occurs, the CT secondary current is severely distorted. When the saturation is associated 
with an internal fault, the DSE based protection would trip correctly. However, it is to be 
investigated that when the saturation is associated with an external fault would the DSE 
based protection behave correctly. 
The test system is illustrated in Figure 7-72. To demonstrate the severe CT saturation, 
the protection zone is a 1 km line spanning from node YJLINE1 to YJLINE2. The system 
is working under normal operation until the Event 1 (and only event) occurs at t=1.2s to 
t=1.8s as a three phase fault close to bus YJLINE2. The operating current through the line 
increases from 850 A (loading current) to 26 kA (fault current). This fault is very severe 
since the line is very short. Only one current transformer is modeled to measure the 
secondary side current of phase A at left terminal of the protection zone. 
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Zoomed in during Event 1 
Figure 7-74 Primary Side Current vs Secondary Side Current by ideal transformation 
 
Figure 7-74 illustrates the comparison between the primary side current of phase A 
and the secondary side current of phase A scaled back by ideal transformation. During 
normal operation without ratio correction factor there is a phase shift between the two, and 
the magnitude of both are slightly different. The difference between the two currents are 
as high as 30A. During external fault the secondary side current is highly distorted and the 
difference between the two currents increases up to 2000A (10% of the primary current). 
The DSE based protection results using either primary side current measurements or 
secondary side current measurements (by multiplying ideal transformation ratio) are 
illustrated in Figure 7-75 and Figure 7-76. The current measurement error is set at 30A. As 
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can be observed, when the primary side current is used, the protection results are correct. 
However, when the secondary side current is used, the DSE based protection would mis-
operate during a severe external fault. A conclusion is arrived that the DSE based protection 













Figure 7-76 DSE based protection results with Secondary side current measurements 
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To address this issue, one option is to model the transmission line and the current 
transformer (also the instrumentation channel) together. In this section only a single phase 
transformer for phase A at YJLINE1 is modeled. See Figure 7-77. The model is 
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where definitions of R, L ,C, iL(t), v1(t), v2(t) are still the same as in (4.3) for transmission 
line, and, 
( )t : the flux linkage of the current transformer at time t 
N : N1/N2 the transformation ratio of the current transformer at time t 
( )mi t : magnetizing current of the current transformer at time t 
( )Lcti t : secondary current of the current transformer that flows through the burden 
wL : leakage reactance 
cL : control cable reactance 
wr : winding resistance 
cr : control cable resistance 
br : burden resistance 
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0i : magnetizing current constant 
0 : flux linkage constant 
Sgn: sign function, it’s 1 when flux is positive, it’s -1 when flux is negative. 
n: exponent of the current transformer 
 
Since this model is highly nonlinear because of its relationship between magnetizing 
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        And quadratic integration can be applied to this model to obtain the SCAQCF 
discretized model. 
        After the combined model of the transmission line, current transformer (single phase), 
control cable and burden is built, the DSE based protection can be applied to this model, 
and the primary current of phase A would not be an actual measurement anymore, instead 
the secondary voltage on the burden would be an actual measurement. This would not 
decrease the degree of freedom of the model. There are 40 states (for both time t and time 
tm), and 52 measurements (for both time t and tm). 
        The DSE protection results for the same test system is again illustrated in Figure 7-78. 
During normal operation when there is no CT saturation, the estimated measurements 
perfectly align with the actual measurements and the confidence level is around 99.99%. 
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During event 1 external fault the estimated measurements still perfectly align with the 
actual measurements. Specifically, Figure 7-79 is a comparison between the measured CT 
secondary voltage and estimated CT secondary voltage, observe the saturated effect here, 











Figure 7-77 Modeling of transmission line, current transformer, and instrumentation 
















Figure 7-79 Comparison of saturated CT secondary voltage and estimated CT 
secondary voltage 
7.11 Summary 
This chapter started with comparing the three different dynamic state estimation 
algorithms, then it provided two test cases to compare the performance of legacy protection 
algorithms with proposed algorithm in terms of security, dependability and sensitivity. It 
also explored the disadvantages from each individual protection algorithm. Finally, it 
investigated the modeling error, synchronization error and instrumentation error that would 




CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
DIRECTION 
8.1 Conclusions 
The main advantage of the DSE based protection with respect to the combination of 
the legacy protections is its sensitivity during high impedance fault when the fault current 
is small compared to the load current, and its security during close external fault when the 
directional element could be easily compromised. The DSE based protection was compared 
with legacy protection functions. The conclusions are: 1) the DSE based protection can 
distinguish an internal fault with an external fault while the directional instantaneous 
overcurrent protection cannot in a short line case (Section 7.5.1), 2) the DSE based 
protection can distinguish an internal fault with a heavy load while the directional time 
overcurrent protection cannot in a long line case (Section 7.6.1), 3) the DSE based 
protection is insensitive to induced voltage while the stepped distance protection may see 
the fault in another zone (see Section 7.7.1), 4) the DSE based protection is insensitive to 
the status of the series compensated capacitor while the stepped distance protection may 
see the fault in another quadrant (see Section 7.7.2), 5) the DSE based protection would 
not mis-operate when there is a sequential tripping on parallel line while the pilot protection 
would mis-operate when the fault current reverses its direction (see Section 7.8.1), 6) the 
DSE based protection is more sensitive on high impedance fault than current differential 
(see Section 7.9.1), 7) the DSE based protection would not be affected by current inversion 
problems while the current differential would see it as through current instead of internal 




The performance of the three dynamic state estimation algorithms is investigated in 
Section 7.2 by comparing the diagonal elements of the covariance matrices and by 
comparing the estimation results during normal operation. It can be seen that all three 
algorithms perform well and there is no one algorithm that outperforms other algorithms 
significantly. 
Practical implementation issues were partially investigated. Some of these issues are: 
1) modeling error: it can be seen that the protection results would only be compromised 
when the modeling error for inductance matrix is over 20%, and as a matter of fact this 
also means that using confidence level as an indicator for modeling error would not be 
proper if high accuracy for parameter is required (see Section 7.10.1), 2) synchronization 
error: it can be seen that the protection results would only be compromised when the sync 
error exceeds 5 microseconds, while IRIG-B usually provides 1 microsecond accuracy (see 
Section 7.10.2), 3) measurement error from potential transformer does not impact the 
protection results significantly, while measurement error from current transformer does 
impact the protection results significantly during CT saturation. However, if both line and 
CT is modeled then the estimated measurements can track the actual measurement 
perfectly (see Section 7.10.3). 
 
8.2 Contributions 
The main contributions of this dissertation are: 1) proposed a new protection algorithm 
for transmission lines to avoid settings and coordination errors, and to fulfill several 
protection gaps [47], [56], 2) proposed the infrastructure for data acquisition systems for 
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the dynamic state estimation based relay [48], 3) developed object-oriented model for 
transmission line, applied and investigated several dynamic state estimation algorithms 
performance for the proposed method, 4) demonstrated the advantage of the proposed 
method with respect to legacy protection methods in numerous cases, and 5) investigated 
practical issues for the application of the proposed method. 
 
 
8.3 Future Work Directions 
Fault diagnosis in transmission lines is a complex task. Meanwhile fault detection is 
only part of it. This thesis is focused on the fault detection for transmission lines. Other 
than that, the fault diagnosis also should include bad data, fault identification, fault location, 
and fault resistance estimation. Modern protective relays often include the functionality of 
single-pole-tripping, to trip only the faulted phase while maintaining the operation of the 
un-faulted phase. This can only be realized when the fault identification method is also 
included. Modern protective relays also include the functionality of fault location, to send 
out crews to the faulted scene. However currently this can only be achieved when the fault 
resistance is very small. Lastly the loss of potential for the potential transformer would 
make the voltage measurement be zero values, the impact to the DSE based protection 






Appendix A: The General Physically Based Transmission Line Model 
This section is heavily referred from “Power System Grounding and Transients: An 
Introduction” by Dr. A. P. Meliopoulos. In this appendix the general physically based 
transmission line model that provides the basis for all other simplified version (including 
the single section and multi section model used in this thesis for protection purpose) is 
described. Figure A.1 illustrates a three-phase transmission line. It comprises of five paths 
of electric current flow: the three phase conductors, shield or neutral conductors, and the 










FigureA.1. The general transmission line model. 
Each conductor i is characterized with a series self-resistance rii, series mutual 
resistance to any other conductor j rij, series self-inductance Liie, series mutual inductance 
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to any conductor j Lije, self capacitance Cii, and mutual capacitance to any other conductor 
j Cij. The series self and mutual resistance and inductance can be computed using Carson’s 





































ir : conductor i resistance, ohms per meter 
di: conductor i geometric mean radius 
De: 2160 / f  
 : soil resistivity 
f: frequency of currents 
ijD : distance between conductors i and j 
 
The self and mutual capacitances are computed according to [50] as: 
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'
ijD : distance between conductor i and image of conductor j with respect to ground 
Then the matrix C’ is inverted to get the capacitance matrix C. 
Here R, L and C are per length. 
Assume there is self and mutual conductance between the phase conductors. Thus the 
KVL and KCL for Figure A.1 gives: 
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The coupled first order differential equations are then translated into second-order 
decoupled differential equations: 
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Solutions to the partial differential equations are mostly numerical. In order to obtain 
a graphical understanding of the general model, an equivalent circuit must be presented. 
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      By decomposition of the above equation into sequence networks, the solutions for 
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      where: 
p1: propagation constant for positive sequence network 
Z1: characteristic impedance for positive sequence network 
p2: propagation constant for negative sequence network 
Z2: characteristic impedance for negative sequence network 
p0: propagation constant for zero sequence network 
Z0: characteristic impedance for zero sequence network 
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Figure A.2 Transmission Line Equivalent Circuit – Sequence Network 
 
where, 
0 sinh( )Z Z pl   








When the transmission line is short, i.e., pl is much smaller than 1.0, the above quantities 
are approximate: 
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Which means that the equivalent circuit series parameters are proportional to the length 
with the resistance or inductance per length, and the shunt parameters are reversely 
proportional to the length with the capacitance per length, regardless of the frequency.  







Appendix B: Example for Computed Chi Square Value in Fault 
Condition 
Even though the DSE based protection allows fast fault detection in only 2 or 3 
samples, the confidence level in a single time step cannot be used as indicator for the 
protection logic, i.e., it is not appropriate to issue trip command based on one single 
confidence level at a certain time step. There are several reasons: 1) during external fault 
or transients, the confidence level may also drop temporarily since the quadratic integration 
may not be able to track a sudden voltage or current change, 2) during internal fault the 
confidence level may oscillates if the fault is very small, 3) the measurement noise at a 
certain sample may be large to cause a low confidence level. 
In this appendix an example is provided to illustrate the second point, it provides the 
analytical form of the chi square value when the device under protection has an internal 
fault, and investigate the behavior of the computed chi square value under the fault. 
Assume the device under protection is a pure resistor and the measurements are the across 









The state is defined as the current through the resistor. This is the simplest device 
under protection. The measurement model is as follow: 







































The standard deviations for the voltage and current are defined as 𝜎𝑣  and 𝜎𝑖 . The 
estimate state at each time step can be computed directly by: 
 
1
ˆ( ) ( )T Tx t H WH H Wz t

  
If during an internal fault, the resistance changes from R1 to R2, then  
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If somehow there is a fault and the resistance changes from R1 to R2, and assume that 
the current measurement through the resistor at time t is i(t), the voltage measurement 
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The estimated measurement z(t) at time t is: 
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The analytical form of the chi square value shows that it is always larger than or equal 
to 0, however it would be a periodic wave when a fault occurs (when R2=R1 this value is 
always 0) with the minimum value being 0, and the frequency of the chi square value is 
double of the fundamental frequency of the power system. If the protection logic relies on 
only the current computed chi square value, then the protection logic would be 1 (trip) 
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when the periodic chi square value is larger than a threshold, and 0 (not to trip) when the 
periodic chi square value is less than a threshold. Specifically, when the chi square value 
is 0 (every half cycle of the power system frequency) the confidence level would be 100%. 
In order to prevent that, this thesis computes the average confidence level and the 
protection logic is to trip when the average confidence level is less than a threshold. 
 
Appendix C: HardFiber System and MU320 Description 
C.1 HardFiber System 
The hardfiber system receives GOOSE control message and transmits SMV message. 






Each field of the data packet header is explained as follow. The HardFiber system does 
not check the source MAC address of the relay since this is dedicated communication. The 
destination MAC address should be multicast, broadcast or unicast, such address is set to 
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01-0C-CD-01-00-00 for multicast. The priority tag is used for poll frames, the TPID is 
0x8100 and the TCI is 0x0000. The link redundancy header is omitted since it’s only 
optional. The Ethertype for GOOSE is 0x88B8 while the Ethertype for SMV is 0x88BA. 
The APPID for GOOSE is 0x00 while the APPID for SMV is 0x01. The length of the 
remaining data is 277 bytes. The reserved field are filled with 0x0000.  
The protocol also defined the APDU (GOOSEPDU) format as the following: 
 
The gocbRef is the GOOSE control block reference, GE designed it to be a fixed length 
of 24 in octets. Any examples is “M81A99000000 /LLN0$GO$C” where the first part is 
the serial number for the device, LLN0 means the device’s logical node 0, GO is short for 
GOOSE, and C stands for “C” dataset. The length of this field can either be determined by 
reading the substation configuration language (SCL) configuration file, or it can be 
determined since the GOOSE data packet uses ASN.1 Basic Encoding Rule so that it also 
records the tag of this field and length of this field. The timeAllowedtoLive is a 32 bits 
integer and the unit is in milliseconds. The dataset is 21 octets set. The goID (GOOSE ID) 
is optional so not implemented here. The field t is the UTC time of when this GOOSE 
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message is generated. The status number (stNum) and sequence number (sqNum) records 
the event sequence. The test field means if this GOOSE message is only for test purpose. 
The confRev is for configuration revision, any relay attempting to revise the format of the 
GOOSE. The ndsCom means if the GOOSE need commissioning and it’s a Boolean. The 
numDatSetEntries means how many data sets the relay is expected to read after this field. 
In the GOOSE message transmitted by GE relay, the number of data sets is 17.  
The allData field is user defined by GE. It contains 17 data in total. The first data is 
the sample number, it is a sample sequence number and must be incremented by the relay 
each successive sample. The value of sampNum sent here will be attached to the sample 
data returned to the relay by each Brick, allowing the correlation of samples from different 
Brick, and detection of missing sample data. All Bricks use this value, whether or not their 
serial numbers match a serNum attribute. The sample number starts with zero and 
increments by one each successive sample, and it rolls over from 232-1 to 0. The second 
and third data is the Brick’s serial number and digital outputs. This two datum are repeated 
for 8 times (in together 17 data including the sample number). This design allows each 
relay to control eight Bricks by one GOOSE message. The digital outputs contain the 
commands from the relay. Upon receiving the GOOSE message, if the serial number 
attribute of a data object matches a Brick serial number appended with the core number, 
that core accepts the outputs attribute of the same data as its commands. This design allows 
the circuit breaker to receive tripping commands from the relay. 
Member 
Offset 
Data Set Member Attribute type Description 
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1 <LDName>/IBRK.U1.SmpNum INT32 Sequence Number of 
Sample Data 
2 <LDName>/IBRK.U1.serNum STRING 13 Brick 1’s serial number 
3 <LDName>/IBRK.U1.outputs Outputs All Brick 1’s commanded 
states for contact outputs, 
latching output, and 
shared outputs 
4 <LDName>/IBRK.U2.serNum STRING 13  
5 <LDName>/IBRK.U2.outputs Outputs  
6 <LDName>/IBRK.U3.serNum STRING 13  
7 <LDName>/IBRK.U3.outputs Outputs  
8 <LDName>/IBRK.U4.serNum STRING 13  
9 <LDName>/IBRK.U4.outputs Outputs  
10 <LDName>/IBRK.U5.serNum STRING 13  
11 <LDName>/IBRK.U5.outputs Outputs  
12 <LDName>/IBRK.U6.serNum STRING 13  
13 <LDName>/IBRK.U6.outputs Outputs  
14 <LDName>/IBRK.U7.serNum STRING 13  
15 <LDName>/IBRK.U7.outputs Outputs  
16 <LDName>/IBRK.U8.serNum STRING 13  




The sampled value message on the other hand, is defined by IEC 61850-9-2 for its 
header and self-defined by GE for its content, and the model of that data set can also be 
determined by reading the SCL configuration file. The header is defined as the following: 
 
The multicast MAC destination address for SMV is 01-0C-CD-04-00-00, the source 
address is the Brick MAC address and it’s unique for each Brick. The priority tag and link 
265 
 
redundancy header is omitted. The Ethertype for SMV is 0x88BA. The APPID is 0x01. 
The length field records how many bytes after this field. Both reserved 1 and 2 are 0x0000. 
The protocol also defined the APDU (SAVPDU) format as the following: 
 
 
The noASDU means how many ASDUs are included in this packet, for the Brick this 
number is 9. The security field is optional and not included. The sequence of ASDU 
(seqASDU) contains the svID field, for the Brick an example would be 
“M84A090000753/F”, which includes the serial number and core number. The dataset field 
is omitted. The smpCnt field is always 0 for the Brick. The configuration revision (confRev) 
means which version is this dataset. The refresh time is omitted. The smpSynch is always 
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false since it’s not the Brick’s responsibility to get synchronized. The smpRate field is 
omitted. The sequence of data (seqData) is then self-defined by GE. 
The sequence of data contains the model field, which represents the product name, 
order code and product version, sample number field, which is the replicated sequence 
number of sampled data in the GOOSE message, and diagnostics field, which includes the 
information about the sync error, loss of supply, transceiver troubleshooting, etc. Also the 
data set contains the analog input that is need for the DSE based protection, digital input, 
contact inputs, etc. See the table that follows: 
Member 
Offset 
Data Set Member Attribute type Description 
1 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac1 INT32 AC1 – Ia  
2 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac2 INT32 AC2 – Ib  
3 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac3 INT32 AC3 – Ic  
4 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac4 INT32 AC4 – Ix  
5 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac5 INT32 AC5 – Va  
6 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac6 INT32 AC6 – Vb 
7 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac7 INT32 AC7 – Vc 
8 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.ac8 INT32 AC8 – Vx 
9 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.dc1 INT32 DC1 
10 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.dc2 INT32 DC2 
11 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.dc3 INT32 DC3 
12 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.contactinputs ContactInputs  
13 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.sharedinputs SharedInputs  
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14 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.outputMonitors OutputMonitors  
15 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.model STRING35 Product 
name 
16 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.SmpNum INT32U Sequence 
number 
17 <LDName>/IBRK.U.analogs.diagnostics Diagnostics  
 
The ICD file for the Brick is also attached below. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> 








<ConnectedAP iedName="IEDName" apName="P1"> 
<Address> 
<P type="IP" xsi:type="tP_IP">192.168.37.199</P> 
<P type="IP-SUBNET" xsi:type="tP_IP-SUBNET">255.255.255.0</P> 
<P type="IP-GATEWAY" xsi:type="tP_IP-GATEWAY">0.0.0.0</P> 
<P type="S-Profile">1</P> 
</Address> 
<SMV ldInst="LDInst" cbName="MSVCB01"> 
<Address> 
<P type="MAC-Address" xsi:type="tP_MAC-Address"> 
01-0C-CD-04-00-00</P> 
<P type="APPID" xsi:type="tP_APPID">0000</P> 
<P type="VLAN-ID" xsi:type="tP_VLAN-ID">007</P> 
<P type="VLAN-PRIORITY" xsi:type="tP_VLAN-PRIORITY">0</P> 
</Address> 
</SMV> 
<SMV ldInst="LDInst" cbName="MSVCB02"> 
<Address> 
<P type="MAC-Address" xsi:type="tP_MAC-Address"> 
01-0C-CD-04-00-00</P> 
<P type="APPID" xsi:type="tP_APPID">0000</P> 
<P type="VLAN-ID" xsi:type="tP_VLAN-ID">007</P> 






<IED type="GE Brick Merging Unit" configVersion="1.0" desc="Brick" 
name="IEDName" manufacturer="GE Multilin"> 
<Services> 
<ConfLNs fixPrefix="true" fixLnInst="true"/> 
<ConfDataSet max="2" maxAttributes="14"/> 
<GOOSE max="0"/> 
<GSESettings cbName="Fix" appID="Dyn"/> 












<LN0 lnType="IEDName/LDInst/LLN0_0" lnClass="LLN0" inst=""> 
<DataSet name="F" desc="Fast Data Set of Brick's Sampled Values 
Transmitted via Multicast SV Service"> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac1"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac2"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac3"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac4"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac5"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac6"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac7"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.ac8"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.dc1"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.dc2"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="MX" doName="U" daName="analogs.dc3"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="ST" doName="U" daName="contactInputs"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="ST" doName="U" daName="sharedInputs"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="ST" doName="U" daName="outputMonitors"/> 
</DataSet> 
<DataSet name="S" desc="Slow Data Set of Brick's Sampled Values 
Transmitted via Multicast SV Service"> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="CF" doName="U" daName="model"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="ST" doName="U" daName="smpNum"/> 
<FCDA ldInst="LDInst" prefix="" lnInst="1" lnClass="IBRK" 
fc="ST" doName="U" daName="diagnostics"/> 
</DataSet> 
<SampledValueControl name="MSVCB01" smvID="0022040080141/F" 
smpRate="128" nofASDU="8" confRev="1" 
datSet="F"> 
<SmvOpts refreshTime="false" sampleSynchronized="true" 
sampleRate="false" security="false" dataRef="false"/> 
</SampledValueControl> 
<SampledValueControl name="MSVCB02" smvID="0022040080141/S" 
smpRate="16" nofASDU="1" confRev="1" 
datSet="S"> 
<SmvOpts refreshTime="false" sampleSynchronized="true" 
sampleRate="false" security="false" dataRef="false"/> 
</SampledValueControl> 
</LN0> 
<LN lnType="IEDName/LDInst/LPHD_0" lnClass="LPHD" inst="1"/> 









<LNodeType id="IEDName/LDInst/LLN0_0" lnClass="LLN0"> 
<DO name="Mod" type="INC_0"/> 
<DO name="Beh" type="INS_0"/> 
<DO name="Health" type="INS_1"/> 
<DO name="NamPlt" type="LPL_0"/> 
</LNodeType> 
<LNodeType id="IEDName/LDInst/LPHD_0" lnClass="LPHD"> 
<DO name="PhyHealth" type="INS_1" /> 
<DO name="Proxy" type="SPS_1"/> 
<DO name="PhyNam" type="DPL_0"/> 
</LNodeType> 
<LNodeType id="IEDName/LDInst/IBRK_0" lnClass="IBRK"> 
<DO name="Mod" type="INC_0"/> 
<DO name="Beh" type="INS_0"/> 
<DO name="Health" type="INS_1"/> 
<DO name="NamPlt" type="LPL_0"/> 
<DO name="U" type="BRICK_0"/> 
</LNodeType> 
<DOType id="INC_0" cdc="INC"> 
<DA name="stVal" fc="ST" dchg="true" bType="Enum" type="Mod"/> 
<DA name="q" fc="ST" qchg="true" bType="Quality"/> 
<DA name="t" fc="ST" bType="Timestamp"/> 
<DA name="ctlModel" fc="CF" bType="Enum" type="ctlModel"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="INS_0" cdc="INS"> 
<DA name="stVal" fc="ST" bType="Enum" type="Beh"/> 
<DA name="q" fc="ST" bType="Quality"/> 
<DA name="t" fc="ST" bType="Timestamp"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="INS_1" cdc="INS"> 
<DA name="stVal" fc="ST" bType="Enum" type="Health"/> 
<DA name="q" fc="ST" bType="Quality"/> 
<DA name="t" fc="ST" bType="Timestamp"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="LPL_0" cdc="LPL"> 
<DA name="vendor" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
<DA name="swRev" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
<DA name="d" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
<DA name="configRev" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="DPL_0" cdc="DPL"> 
<DA name="vendor" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"> 
<Val>GE Multilin</Val> 
</DA> 
<DA name="swRev" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"> 
<Val>5.601</Val> 
</DA> 
<DA name="serNum" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
<DA name="model" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
<DA name="location" fc="DC" bType="VisString255"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="SPS_1" cdc="SPS"> 
<DA name="stVal" fc="ST" dchg="true" bType="BOOLEAN"/> 
<DA name="q" fc="ST" qchg="true" bType="Quality"/> 
<DA name="t" fc="ST" bType="Timestamp"/> 
</DOType> 
<DOType id="BRICK_0" cdc="BRICK"> 
<DA name="smpNum" fc="ST" bType="INT32U" dchg="true"/> 
<DA name="model" fc="CF" bType="VisString35"/> 
<DA name="serNum" fc="CF" bType="VisString13"/> 
<DA name="outputs" fc="CO" bType="BitString32" dchg="true"/> 
<DA name="analogs" fc="MX" bType="Struct" type="Analogs_0"/> 
<DA name="contactInputs" fc="ST" bType="BitString32" dchg="true"/> 
<DA name="sharedInputs" fc="ST" bType="BitString32" dchg="true"/> 
<DA name="outputMonitors" fc="ST" bType="BitString32" dchg="true"/> 
<DA name="diagnostics" fc="ST" bType="Struct" type="Diagnostics_0"/> 





<BDA name="ac1" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac2" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac3" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac4" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac5" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac6" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac7" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="ac8" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="dc1" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="dc2" bType="INT32U"/> 
<BDA name="dc3" bType="INT32U"/> 
</DAType> 
<DAType id="Diagnostics_0"> 
<BDA name="diagnosticFlags" bType="BitString32"/> 
<BDA name="adcTemp" bType="INT16"/> 
<BDA name="transceiverTemp" bType="INT16"/> 
<BDA name="transceiverVolts" bType="INT16"/> 
<BDA name="transceiverCurrent" bType="INT16"/> 
<BDA name="transceiverTxPower" bType="INT16"/> 































The MU320 and Siemens 7SC805 follows the IEC 61850-9-2 light edition, which 
defines explicitly the data set members that would be transmitted through sampled value 





Data Set Member Attribute type Description 
1 InnATCTR1.Amp.instMag.i INT32 Ia value  
2 InnATCTR1.Amp.instMag.q INT32 Ia quality  
3 InnBTCTR2.Amp.instMag.i INT32 Ib value 
4 InnBTCTR2.Amp.instMag.q INT32 Ib quality  
5 InnCTCTR3.Amp.instMag.i INT32 Ic value  
6 InnCTCTR3.Amp.instMag.q INT32 Ic quality 
7 InnNmTCTR4.Amp.instMag.i INT32 In value 
8 InnNmTCTR4.Amp.instMag.q INT32 In quality 
9 UnnATVTR1.Vol.instMag.i INT32 Va value 
10 UnnATVTR1.Vol.instMag.q INT32 Va quality 
11 UnnBTVTR2.Vol.instMag.i INT32 Vb value 
12 UnnBTVTR2.Vol.instMag.q INT32 Vb quality 
13 UnnCTVTR3.Vol.instMag.i INT32 Vc value 
14 UnnCTVTR3.Vol.instMag.q INT32 Vc quality 
15 UnnNmTVTR4.Vol.instMag.i INT32 Vn value 
16 UnnNmTVTR4.Vol.instMag.q INT32 Vn quality 
 
Same as the naming convention from the data set member for the Brick, the name for 
each data object goes with Logical Node.Data Object.Data Attribute. Different from the 
data set member defined for the Brick, the light edition defined both instantaneous value 
and quality for each measurement.  
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